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The coordinators of this report would like to thank all the contributors who, in this busy period, have 
worked hard to respond quickly to the requests of the FRB and provided precise information that is 
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raised. 
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1. PURPOSE OF THIS APPROACH 
 
1.1. Government expectations 
 
The major public health, economic and social crisis resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic raises many 
questions as to its origin, its dynamics and the mechanisms that explain it. This pandemic also raises 
questions about the future: on the implication of environmental issues in this type of phenomenon, and 
on the conditions that would have allowed to, if not prevent, then at least better anticipate this crisis and 
reduce its impact, in order to be better prepared in the future. Decision-making structures, governments 
and ministries confronted with widely divergent views and opinions, particularly on the link between 
Covid-19 and the biodiversity crisis, have turned to research organizations for answers to the following 
questions: 
 
 
• How is the current health crisis related to wildlife? What role did wild species play in the 
emergence of this pandemic? 
• What is the link between this type of crisis, biodiversity loss and the destruction of natural 
habitats? Can we draw a parallel between the damage done to biodiversity and the increase in 
zoonotic diseases, which are a source of epidemics and even pandemics? 
• What is the link between this type of crisis, food production and transportation systems (for 
humans, livestock, agricultural products)? Can certain agricultural and food production systems, 
or the increasing rate of international transport, directly or indirectly facilitate the evolution of an 
emerging infectious disease into an epidemic and ultimately into a pandemic? 
 
The relevant ministries and research institutions of the AllEnvi alliance (The National Alliance for 
Environmental Research) have entrusted the FRB (The French Foundation for Biodiversity Research) and 
its Scientific Council with the task of giving the biodiversity science community's perspective on the 
current crisis, and on the relationship between zoonotic diseases, biodiversity and ecosystem services. 
 
This report had three objectives: 
 
• identify the issues for which there is consensus in the scientific community (including regarding 
the questions raised by the different departments); 
• outline the issues that remain open to question, because of dissensus within the research 
community or gaps in the scientific knowledge; 
• deliver messages to decision makers; make science-based recommendations for actions or 
options of measures that could be taken, in order to assist public decision-making. 
 
1.2. Mobilization of the FRB 
 
In addition to its president, director and core staff members, the FRB has mobilized its Scientific Council 
and a panel of external experts that were selected by associated research institutions or members of the 
Scientific Council (nearly 40 people in total). A support group was established to oversee the preparation 
and production of the report. Biodiversity research often involves field data collection and multifactorial 
analyses that require a publication timeframe that is often longer than that of other branches of 
experimental biology. Moreover, understanding a particular situation within a complex system requires 
making comparisons with other similar situations. Given that this pandemic is very recent, it is normal at 
this stage that very little scientific work has been published on the link between Covid-19 and biodiversity. 
The Committee has therefore decided to include in this report data on zoonotic diseases from the last 
20/30 years (SARS, Ebola, Zika, Dengue fever, Lyme’s disease, etc.) and to clearly identify what is known, 
or not known, about outbreaks of infectious diseases, with emphasis on the evidence available for Covid-
19. 
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The committee has come up with a list of questions (and sub-questions when necessary), which have 
been divided into two categories: 
• The factors underlying the emergence of zoonoses; 
• Possible measures that could be taken to reduce the risk of zoonoses. 
 
Each question, or sub-question, is the subject of a dedicated fact sheet (22 in total) containing the 
following sections: 
• Elements of scientific consensus; 
• Elements of scientific dissensus; 
• Lack of knowledge or analytical bias; 
• Research needs; 
• Special case of Covid-19. 
 
The content of these sheets is based on articles published in international peer-reviewed journals. Articles 
cited in the text can be accessed through their link. Each sheet is written by a single author, and is 
reviewed by the entire group of scientists involved. Clearly showing dissensus should allow the expression 
of the diversity of opinions on a given topic. 
 
1.3. Delivery of the report 
 
In addition to these fact sheets, the report also contains this introduction, a glossary and a summary of 
the general trends associated with zoonotic diseases. 
 
In view of the scope this project, the extremely tight schedule set by the ministries and the lack of 
knowledge on Covid-19, the timeline for the delivery of this report was as follows: 
 
• 5th May 2020: release of a draft version, comprising all sections, with for each an indication of the 
stage of validation by the group of experts on that date.  
• 6th May 2020: oral presentation to stakeholders, at their request.  
• Mid-May 2020: publication on the FRB website of the French version of this report. The fact 
sheets and summary will be updated regularly as new information becomes available.  
 
The report was handed over to the public authorities in its current form. Unlike procedures used notably 
by the IPBES, there is no review process by the public authorities that commissioned this work. 
 
1.4. Dissemination and disclaimer 
 
As indicated above, the report is freely accessible on the FRB website. 
 
The views and recommendations expressed in this report are based on the review of scientific knowledge 
by a small group of specialists in the field of biodiversity sciences; consequently, these findings may not 
have the full support of other scientific communities, but may open up the debate between the scientific 
and decision-making arenas. 
Although a wide range of experts from different research institutions have contributed to this report, the 
latter does not necessarily reflect the views of the research institutions and does not engage their 
responsibility in any way. 
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2. GLOSSARY 
 
Co-evolution: Co-evolution is defined by Jantzen (1980, Evolution) as the evolutionary change of a life 
trait in individuals of one species in response to a trait in individuals of a second species, followed by an 
evolutionary response of the second species to the change in the first.  
➢ Here: The reciprocal and adaptive genetic changes in interacting host and pathogen species 
(Woolhouse et al. 2002, Nat Genet). 
 
EcoHealth: The EcoHealth concept is defined as an ecosystem approach to health, which focuses on 
environmental and socio-economic issues and was initially developed by epidemiologists working in the 
field of biodiversity conservation. The EcoHealth paradigm applies an integrative approach to health 
issues and links public health to the management of natural resources and, more broadly, to the 
environment. EcoHealth can be viewed as a One Health approach that emphasizes interdisciplinary 
approaches and active citizen participation (Roger et al. 2016, Inf. Ecol. & Epidemio.).  
 
Emerging: Emerging diseases can be defined as infections that have newly emerged in a population or 
already exist but are rapidly increasing in incidence, global distribution or have a new clinical expression 
(Morse 1990). They are sometimes distinguished from epidemics on the basis of their geographical 
spread; the term may also be less alarming to the public. 
 
Endemic: In the context of disease, the concept of endemic refers to the constant presence and/or 
usual prevalence of a disease or infectious agent in a given population or geographic area (CDC 2012). As 
endemics spread across populations and areas, they can evolve into epidemics/pandemics. 
 
Epidemic: An epidemic is the occurrence of more cases of disease, injury, or other health condition 
than expected in a given area or among a specific group of persons during a particular period. Usually, 
cases are presumed to have a common cause or be related to one another in some way (CDC 2012). 
 
Epidemiology: The discipline of epidemiology addresses the influence of various factors (individual 
health, environment, lifestyle, social environment) on diseases, particularly on their frequency, 
distribution and etiology, but also on any other specific biological or social phenomenon (Med. Biol. T. 
201971). 
 
Exposure: In relation to health, exposure is having come into contact with a cause of, or possessing a 
characteristic that is a determinant of a particular health problem (CDC 2012). 
 
Global Health: Global Heath can be defined as the area of study, research and practice that gives 
priority to improving human health and achieving health equity for people across the world, drawing on 
the contributions of medicine, public health, epidemiology, demography, economics and sociology. Global 
Health can be measured from various global diseases, their prevalence worldwide and the risk of a 
reduction in life expectancy (Beaglehole and Bonita 2010, Glob Health Action Wikipedia page). 
 
One Health: The One Health concept defines a collaborative and integrated approach to human, 
animal, plant and environmental health, to reinforce prevention systems and enable the early and 
systemic management of diseases with multifactorial causes. Antimicrobial resistance, which threatens 
human, animal and environmental health, is an emblematic example that uses surveillance and reporting 
tools to improve global health security and achieve developmental gains. Infectious diseases and 
antimicrobial resistance are just a part of the One Health approach, which can be applied to a wide range 
of issues (e.g. water and soil pollution affecting animals and the environment) (World bank group 2018). 
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Pandemic: An epidemic occurring over a widespread area (multiple countries or continents) and 
usually affecting a substantial proportion of the population (CDC 2012). 
 
Pathocenosis: This is a synthetic approach for the historical study of diseases, which models the 
interactions between the different diseases in a population and whose distribution curve has a 
mathematical expression (Coste et al. 2016). 
 
Pathosystem: The subset of an ecosystem that involves parasitism, and can potentially include all 
hosts and parasites in the ecosystem (Kempken 2013, Technology & Engineering). 
 
Planetary health: The concept of planetary health is defined as the achievement of the highest 
possible level of human health, well-being and equity in the world through judicious choices for human 
systems - political, economic and social - that shape the future of humanity and the Earth's natural 
systems and define the environmental limits within which humanity can flourish. In more simple terms, 
planetary health refers to the health of human civilization and the state of the natural systems on which it 
depends (Whitmee et al. 2015). 
 
Risk: Risk is defined as the potential for consequences where something of value is at stake and where 
the outcome is uncertain, recognizing the diversity of values. Risk is often represented as the probability 
of occurrence of hazardous events or trends multiplied by the impacts if those events or trends occur. 
Risk results from the interaction of vulnerability, exposure and hazard (IPCC). 
 
Spillover: The initial invasion of a pathogen into a new host (Keesing et al. 2010). 
 
Vulnerability: The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. Vulnerability encompasses a 
variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to 
cope and adapt (IPCC).    
 
Zoonosis: Diseases and infections where pathogens are naturally transmitted from vertebrate animals 
to humans (Haddad et al. 2019). 
  
  p. 8 
 
3. LIST OF ISSUES ADDRESSED 
 
3.1. Understanding zoonotic diseases 
 
• Is the frequency of zoonotic diseases increasing, if so, since when? (SHEET 1) 
• Are there more contacts between humans and wildlife, and if so, why? (SHEET 2) 
• What is the geography of emerging zoonotic diseases? How can it be explained? (SHEET 3) 
• Are certain human populations more at risk? (SHEET 4) 
• What roles can co-evolutionary processes between humans and pathogens play? (SHEET 5) 
• Are certain taxonomic groups more likely to cause zoonotic diseases? If so, why? (SHEET 6) 
• What do we know about the processes that enable different types of human pathogens to cross 
the species barrier? (SHEET 7) 
• Are intermediate hosts always critical for the emergence of zoonotic diseases? (SHEET 8) 
• What are the evidence-based links between zoonotic diseases and biodiversity loss? (SHEET 9) 
• What are the evidence-based links between zoonotic diseases and deforestation (and the 
development of agriculture and monospecific plantations)? (SHEET 10) 
• What are the evidence-based links between zoonotic diseases and the development of human 
infrastructure (roads, etc.)? (SHEET 11) 
• What are the evidence-based links between zoonotic diseases and urbanization? (SHEET 12) 
• Is there a link between the increase in the number of zoonoses, climate change and exceptional 
climatic events? (SHEET 13) 
• What are the evidence-based links between zoonotic diseases and the development of bushmeat 
consumption wildlife trafficking associated with traditional pharmacopoeia? (SHEET 14) 
• Is it possible to generalise the mechanisms of interaction between livestock, the environment and 
health be generalized?  (SHEET 15) 
• What is the link between zoonotic diseases and the development of large-scale livestock farming, 
the reduction in the number of farmed species and the genetic homogenization of these species? 
(SHEET 16) 
• What is the risk posed by human epidemics to wild species (e.g. primates) and pets? (SHEET 17) 
 
3.2. Recommendations for addressing the risk of zoonoses 
 
• Should we develop zoonotic disease prediction methods (and models), and on what basis, or 
should we prioritise the monitoring of weak signals of potential zoonoses? (SHEET 18) 
• Is it possible to identify sentinel species? (SHEET 19) 
• Could the management or eradication of wild species and populations that are likely to cause 
zoonoses be an alternative? How can we avoid the negative reactions in certain sections of the 
population to species seen as as potential sources of zoonotic diseases and epidemics? (SHEET 
20) 
• Can the development of protected areas help reduce the risk of zoonotic diseases? What are the 
processes involved and what would be the required level of protection? (SHEET 21) 
• Does maintaining high species/genetic biodiversity prevent or limit the emergence of zoonotic 
diseases? What generalizable is the dilution effect? (SHEET 22) 
 
  p. 9 
 
4. SYNTHESIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The contribution of biodiversity sciences to our understanding of zoonotic diseases 
 
The relationship between humans and other species implies a wide variety of interactions and feedbacks 
that result from the diversity of utilitarian, relational and ethical approaches that drive these interactions. 
These approaches condition the dimensions of human well-being, of which health is a key component. 
Biodiversity and its components have many positive, as well as some negative, effects on human health. 
Epidemiological risk associated with zoonotic disease is one of the dimensions of the risks associated with 
certain components of biodiversity; they are modulated by the different ways humans and these 
elements of biodiversity interact. 
 
Over the past 50 years, the number of epidemics worldwide has risen significantly. The death toll varies 
greatly from one epidemic to the next (SHEET 1). The increase in the number of epidemics of zoonotic 
origin can in part be explained by increased contact between humans and wildlife (SHEET 2). Different 
geographical areas do not present the same risk of emergence of infectious or parasitic diseases:  
emerging zoonoses originate predominantly in intertropical zones (SHEET 3). However, it is difficult to 
determine whether certain human populations are more susceptible to zoonotic diseases (SHEET 4). Host-
pathogen interactions are accompanied by co-evolutionary processes whose dimensions depend on the 
time scale under consideration, but also on the respective generation time of humans and pathogens 
SHEET 5). 
 
Certain groups of animals are more frequently the cause of zoonoses than others (SHEET 6). Spillover 
(where infectious agents cross the "species barrier") seems to be easier between humans and primates, 
due to their phylogenetic proximity, and between humans and certain species that have a long-standing 
commensal relationship with them (SHEET 7). Intermediate hosts, which may allow infectious agents to 
become pathogenic to humans, may be involved in zoonosis but are not mandatory (SHEET 8). 
  
Science is increasingly showing correlations between global environmental change, loss of biodiversity 
and associated regulatory services, and the emergence or increase in prevalence of infectious diseases 
(SHEET 9). The erosion of biodiversity, via ecological, epidemiological, adaptive/evolutionary and 
anthropogenic factors, can increase zoonotic risk. There is a strong consensus regarding the link between 
deforestation, in its various dimensions, and the multiplication of zoonoses in Asia, Africa and South 
America. Many factors that are directly or indirectly associated with deforestation can account for this 
situation (SHEET 10). The development of human infrastructure, especially transport infrastructure, acts 
as a facilitator of zoonoses and contributes to their evolution into epidemics and pandemics (SHEET 11). 
Urban development SHEET 12) increases health risks by promoting contact with certain elements of 
wildlife, particularly in sub-urban areas. Urban centres can be both sites of disease emergence and 
epicentres of epidemics. Recent trends, such as eco-tourism and the desire for contact with nature, could 
in some situations facilitate contact with infectious agents, in particular those transmitted in some 
countries by non-human primates. However, in no way does this lessen the benefits to human well-being 
of reconnecting with nature. 
Climate change is one of the factors affecting the distribution and activity of species, and consequently 
affects certain zoonoses, particularly arthropod vector-borne diseases. Climate-sensitive pathogens have 
been identified, particularly in developed countries (SHEET 13). 
 
The link between the consumption and trade of bushmeat and emerging infectious diseases has been 
established in several instances. The risk of infection is amplified by a lack of public awareness of the 
health risks, and the increasing demands (in terms volume and range of species) for feeding a wildlife 
market that has become urban and global. The most critical phase for disease emergence seems to be 
when there is direct contact, either when hunting or keeping captive wild animals, or preparing carcasses 
(SHEET 14). 
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Biosecurity measures can be implemented on industrial farms; thus, the risk of disease emergence on 
these farms is less frequent, but when a disease does emerge, it can spread rapidly throughout the 
production chain (via trade routes), as seen during various outbreaks of avian influenza (SHEET 15). The 
exponential development worldwide of livestock and poultry farms where a single species with reduced 
genetic diversity is reared produces large target compartments for zoonoses and therefore favourable 
conditions for the spread of epidemics (SHEET 16). 
 
There are many examples of pathogens that have been transmitted from humans to domestic animals, 
pets or wildlife, including marine mammals and Antarctic birds. Great apes are subject to outbreaks of 
measles and various respiratory infections caused by viruses of human origin. Increased interaction 
between humans and wildlife can lead to complex interactions between anthroponotic and zoonotic 
transmission processes (SHEET 17). 
 
What recommendations can be made to minimize the risk of zoonotic diseases? 
 
Mapping of areas presenting a high risk of disease emergence, i.e. where hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability of populations overlap, can be done to locate on a regional scale where this risk may occur. 
Zoonotic risk is greater in tropical forest areas, areas with high mammal species richness and areas 
undergoing shifts in land use towards agriculture (SHEET 18). 
The identification of sentinel species, which could be used to detect the emergence of an infectious 
disease by providing advance warning, may be possible in certain known cases once the dynamics of the 
pathogen are understood (SHEET 19). 
 
Strategies for responding to the risk of emergence need to be put in place at both an individual and a 
collective level. These strategies can fit in with the numerous recommendations to respect non-human 
life by, on the one hand, encouraging conservation and minimizing the disturbance of natural habitats, 
and, on the other hand, employing protective measures that avoid or strictly limit the handling of animals.  
 
Local populations are concerned about the health risk associated with the nearby presence of species 
implicated in zoonoses, and may demand that actions be taken. However, the pure and simple elimination 
of a particular taxon, population or sub-population in a given area, beyond the ethical issues it raises, is 
problematic, and, above all, may prove to be extremely costly and totally counter-productive in terms of 
health benefits (SHEET 20). When possible, the vaccination of humans, domestic or farm animals but also 
wild hosts is an effective solution. 
Rather than considering culling wild animals, human populations, farmed animals and pets should be kept 
away from potential hosts of pathogens that may cause zoonotic diseases. Understanding the behaviour 
of zoonosis-causing species can guide human practices, and be used to limit their access to resources or 
habitats and protect against the risk of contamination.  
 
There is a need to better understand the complex and highly diverse relationship humans have with 
wildlife, which will vary depending on location and societal context. Recommendations should be based 
on a clear understanding of these relationships otherwise they are unlikely to be implemented or have 
any effect. 
It is essential to invest in awareness raising, education and collective approaches, provided these are 
adapted to the cultural specificities of different human societies, which have formed over time a complex 
and highly diversified relationship with wildlife. Local preventive measures must be based on accurate 
knowledge of this relationship in order to reinforce their implementation and achieve the desired effects. 
Education, especially of children, can help reduce the risk of direct interaction with wildlife by 
discouraging handling wild animals and by avoiding the negative reactions of certain populations to 
species perceived as dangerous. 
 
The development of protected areas is a favoured option for preserving wildlife habitats and reducing 
contact with humans (SHEET 21). In protected areas, land use changes, particularly deforestation, can be 
strictly limited and human incursion and associated activities including wildlife harvesting can be reduced. 
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From an ecological point of view, and even though there is some dissensus within the scientific 
community, the hypothesis that maintaining biological communities with high species diversity within 
protected areas prevents the emergence of major zoonotic pathogens reinforces the rationale for 
promoting protected areas (SHEET 22). 
A policy promoting the development of protected areas may involve the creation of new areas, the 
expansion of existing areas and, above all, dialogue with local populations, taking their knowledge into 
account, as well as increasing the protection level of these areas. However, the development of protected 
areas and the restrictions associated with high protection levels raise social, political and economic 
questions; it entails a need to educate the public, given the growing concerns surrounding the risk of 
zoonoses and epidemics. These concerns, in view of the existence of areas where wild animals can thrive, 
may be over the development of new protected areas or may call into question the future of existing 
protected areas. 
A strategy for the development of protected areas must be conceived at the appropriate territorial scale 
by promoting dialogue with local populations, who can help protect of biodiversity and regulate access to 
protected sites, without calling into question the dual imperative of protecting biodiversity and limiting 
the transmission of pathogens to humans, farm animals or wildlife. 
However, better biodiversity conservation, particularly in developing countries, is only possible and 
sustainable if the pressures linked to resource consumption, particularly coming in from outside 
(imported deforestation), are significantly reduced. 
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6. FILES 
 
SHEET 1 
Is the frequency of zoonotic diseases increasing, and if so, since when?  
Are some taxonomic groups more likely than others to? If yes 
CONSENSUS: 
 
Over the past 50 years, the number of epidemics worldwide has risen significantly with on average two to 
three new infectious agents emerging each year (Jones et al. 2008, Nature). An acceleration in the 
frequency of disease outbreaks, particularly of zoonotic origin, has been observed since the early 1980s 
(Smith et al. 2014, J R Soc Interface; and Morand et al. 2014, Plos One for a closer look at South East Asia). 
These trends are significant, even when taking into account the fact that the monitoring effort has been 
increased, which could confound these observations (Morand and Lajaunie 2017, ISTE Press Ltd. ). After 
controlling reporting bias, we do observe an increase over this period of time in the number of epidemics, 
particularly of animal origin, with mortality varying greatly from one epidemic to another (a few dozen to 
12,000 for SARS-CoV-1 and 20,000 deaths for Ebola virus diseases). 
The emergence and spread of antimicrobial resistance is also becoming a problem worldwide. This has a 
major impact on public health as it helps the spread of infectious diseases. The effects of antimicrobial 
resistance on animal health and biodiversity are still poorly known, but its transmission pathways involve 
wildlife and the environment. An integrated (One Health) approach to antibiotic resistance is essential 
(Goutard et al., 2017, BMJ). 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
There may be some disagreement, not on the increase in the frequency of epidemics, but on the number 
of cases of illness that are caused by an emerging zoonotic disease (often only a few), on the use of 
different diagnostic tools at different points in time and on changing human demographics (the effects of 
population size on pathogen diversity and the spread of epidemic waves). There may also be a sampling 
bias, with previously known or major types of diseases or epidemic events receiving particular attention, 
and conversely, other diseases, whose exact etiological origin has not been established, being classified 
under generic terms such as "influenza syndrome" or "infectious pneumonia". There is also a tendency to 
underestimate co-infections, which has consequences for the recording of infectious agents in circulation, 
including those of animal origin (Razzauti et al. 2015 Plos NTD, Moutailler et al. 2016, Plos NTD). 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
There may be a bias in how these events are counted, especially if the etiological origin or mode of 
transmission of a pathogen is not known, as is the case at present for the SARS-CoV-2 virus responsible for 
Covid-19. In addition, although the discovery of new viral entities has increased since the second half of 
the 20th century, it is unclear whether these are indeed new species and whether they can be considered 
pathogenic to humans (Woolhouse et al. 2008, Proc Biol Sci). There is still confusion between the notion 
of microbe and pathogen, one not necessarily being the other. Furthermore, new microbes are nowadays 
mainly characterized by molecular sequencing, which does not inform on whether these particles or cells 
are viable and at what density they infect organs (the notion of inoculum) (Hosseini et al. 2017, Phil. 
Trans. R. Soc. B). Many endemic diseases, of which many are of zoonotic origin, do not sufficiently 
mobilise decision-makers and the public and private sector. These diseases affect nearly one billion 
people, especially in tropical countries (for Africa, see Hotez and Kamath 2009, Plos NTD). To reverse this 
trend, several of these diseases have been put on the WHO’s "neglected tropical disease" list. Lack of data 
for these diseases also introduces a bias in the case count (under-reporting, confusion with other 
diseases). 
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NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
It would be interesting to refine this trend by determining the proportion of zoonotic diseases that are 
transmitted by wildlife and by domestic animals, and assess the relative importance of these groups in 
disease emergence. In addition, improvement in diagnosis without a priori knowledge (exploratory 
infectiology) would make it possible to uncover new or underestimated infectious agents that may be 
responsible for specific outbreaks (the subject of attribution), whereas at present they are linked to 
outbreaks of syndromic origin. 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
Covid-19 is due to the emergence of a coronavirus-type infectious agent that belongs to a known viral 
family with previously identified risk factors (Cheng et al. 2007, Clin Microbiol Rev). However, the host 
species of origin and the modes of transmission of the virus causing this pandemic are not precisely 
known to date. 
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SHEET 2 
Are there more contacts between humans and wildlife, and if so, why? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
Changes in land use, particularly the exploitation of forests in intertropical regions, bring humans in 
contact with microorganisms (Karesh et al. 2012, The Lancet, Jones et al. , 2013 PNAS, Combe et al. 2019, 
Emerg. Microbes Infect.). Recent assessments have shown an increase in deforestation in different parts 
of the world, with 100 million hectares of forest lost between 1980 and 2000 (IPBES 2019, IPBES 
Secretariat). Wildlife trade is also expanding, but the situation regarding poaching is harder to quantify 
because of the clandestine nature of this activity, which affects the poorest populations (Can et al. 2019, 
GECCO). In developed countries, urban greening, certain forms of rewilding , outdoor activities (Millins et 
al. 2017, Phil Trans, Kilpatrick et al. 2017, Phil Trans, Sandifer et al. 2015, Ecosyst Serv), as well as the 
demand for new species of pets (e.g. cases of Monkeypox in the United States, Bernard and Anderson 
2006, EID) could promote contacts between humans, wildlife and infectious agents. These elements point 
to an increase in contacts between humans and wildlife (Symes et al. 2018, Nat Comm). 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
Globally, biodiversity loss could ultimately reduce human/wildlife contacts, simply due to a lack of wildlife, 
although the situation may differ greatly from one region of the world to another. However, it is 
important to clarify what is meant by “biodiversity loss”, as this loss may benefit a small number of 
species (for example, certain human commensal species) that are potentially involved in zoonotic 
diseases. Nevertheless, the proportion of wild species without any contact with humans is undoubtedly 
decreasing, and exposure is on the rise. 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
Studies quantifying these contacts are lacking, particularly on a local scale. Studies of socio-ecosystems 
with limited contacts or few outbreak occurrences are also lacking (Duvall 2008, Landscape Ecol., Leblan 
2017 EHESS Coll. “En temps & Lieux", Guégan et al. 2020, Env. Res. let.). Moreover, the notion of 
"contact" is relatively imprecise: in the literature, a distinction is made between "direct" contact (physical 
exposure to body fluids from an infected animal, but also exposure to aerosols) and "indirect" or 
"secondary" contact (via fomites, excreta or vectors sharing the same habitat as humans). In addition, the 
notion of "close contact" may refer to bodily proximity both with and without physical contact (Narat et 
al. 2017, EcoHealth). Knowledge is also lacking regarding the effects of spatial planning (of protected 
areas) on exposure risk (i.e. area size and shape influence the quantity of borders (fractal dimension of 
the fringes) and thus the amount of interaction with the wild) (Hosseini et al. 2017, Phil. Trans. R. Soc B ). 
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
Clearly, approaches that are similar to those proposed by Rulli et al. (2017, Sci Rep) and Olivero et al. 
(2017, Sci Rep), which consider the spatial topology of different environments (urban and peri-urban 
environments, agricultural and livestock areas, natural ecosystems), their interaction and their evolution, 
should be developed. Planning scenarios should also be analysed and interpreted in the light of the 
microbiological hazards present, and the level of exposure and vulnerability of individuals and 
populations. Studies that model land fragmentation and human/wildlife contacts (Faust et al. 2018, Ecol 
Lett, Bloomfield et al. , 2020, Landscape Ecology) could be followed up with an analysis of their impact on 
infectious risk. 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
Studies on the bats (flying foxes) responsible for transmitting the Hendra virus have been carried out 
(Plowright et al. 2011, Procs B). However, data is lacking for horseshoe bats, several species of which 
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could be involved in the emergence in China of the coronavirus causing Covid-19. It has already been 
shown that human presence constitutes a stress factor for bat colonies and induces changes in their social 
behaviour (Ancillotto, et al. 2019, LUP). Conversely, certain human socio-cultural practices may promote 
contact with bats (Ohemeng et al. 2017, Anthrozoös). Viruses that are phylogenetically close to the one 
that caused the Covid-19 crisis have been identified in horseshoe bats (Lau et al. 2005, PNAS, Li et al. 
2005, Science, Hu et al. 2018, Emerg Microbes Infect, Zhou et al. 2020, Nature) and pangolins (Lam et al. 
2020, Nature). The latter are sold in large numbers on Asian markets for food and pharmacopoeia 
(Challender et al. 2020 in « Pangolins », Elsevier), and are also "kept" on wild animal farms ('t Sas-Rolfes 
and Challender 2020 in "Pangolins", Elsevier), providing much opportunity for contact with humans and 
interaction with other species. These conditions facilitate the emergence of new viruses. 
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SHEET 3 
What is the geography of emerging zoonotic diseases? How can it be explained? 
Are some taxonomic groups more likely than others to? If yes 
CONSENSUS: 
 
The different regions of the world do not present the same risk of emergence of infectious or parasitic 
diseases (Wolfe et al. 2007, Nature). Spatially explicit modelling predicts that there is a high risk of disease 
emergence in regions with tropical forests, high mammalian diversity and changes in land use related to 
agricultural practices (Allen et al. 2017, Nat Comm, Morse et al. 2012, Lancet). Infectious risk being 
determined by the combination of three components: hazard, exposure and vulnerability (of individuals 
and populations), it is greater in areas with high biodiversity and high human population density. Research 
has shown that areas with high mammalian species richness globally coincide with areas with high plant 
and microorganism species richness (Schipper et al 2008, Science). Furthermore, there is a correlation 
between mammal and bird species richness and the number of infectious diseases (Dunn et al. 2010, 
Proc. R. Soc. B., Morand and Lajaunie 2017, ISTE Press Ltd.). Macroorganism hotspots, and thus 
microorganism hotspots, pose a greater threat, or hazard, in intertropical regions. A correlation between 
the number of endangered species and zoonotic disease emergence has also been found (Morand and 
Lajaunie 2017, ISTE Press Ltd.). There are likely to be differences in exposure levels and exposure history 
between temperate and tropical regions; in the intertropics, exposure to wildlife and its infectious agents 
is increased due to deforestation and bushmeat consumption activities (Wolfe et al. 2005, EID, Karesh et 
al. 2012, The Lancet). Similarly, the threat posed by microorganisms, and their hosts and vectors, 
constitutes an infectious risk when it coincides with socio-economic factors that aggravate the chances of 
transmission to humans: e.g. greater exposure through enhanced contact with wildlife, and an 
epidemiological terrain that favours the spread of disease among dense, poor and unhealthy populations 
(Guégan et al. 2020, Env. Res. Let.). Thus, in temperate zones, the microbiological hazard linked to 
biodiversity hotspots poses a risk of zoonotic emergence that is lower (and also better detected and 
highly linked to antibiotic resistance, see Jones et al. 2008, Nature) than in tropical zones. In particular, 
this is due to the lower vulnerability of human populations in temperate regions, which is due to several 
factors including better public health and education systems and lower human population densities with 
fewer rapidly growing megacities (Neiderud 2015, Infect Ecol Epidemiol). This view may need to be re-
examined in the light of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
Depending on the evolution of human factors that increase or decrease the vulnerability and exposure of 
populations, risk areas could change. For example, the epidemic events observed in South East Asia are 
linked to the high concentration of conurbations, combined with the presence of biodiversity hotspots 
and increased exposure through human practices (consumption of natural resources and occupation of 
natural ecosystems). A similar trend could be observed in the future in, for example, West or Central 
Africa, or in Mesoamerica or South America, with the development of cities that are in contact with 
diverse microbial reservoirs, and the growing exploitation of natural biomes and their biodiversity 
(Guégan et al. 2020, Env. Res. Let.). Research into the relationship between biodiversity and health is 
often designed by zoologists rather than public health experts so that all too often the notion of hazard is 
confused with that of risk. As a result, most maps produced nowadays represent hazards and not risks 
(Guégan and Simard 2015, Actualité et dossier en santé publique). 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
The use of biodiversity hotspot maps is not enough to assess a potential infection risk, since there may be 
other factors such as local resistance to treatments that could modify the epidemic potential in that 
particular area. 
The possibility that geographical variations in zoonotic risk may be influenced by the link between the 
intraspecific genetic diversity of infectious agents and their emergence success may have been 
understudied compared to the link between interspecific pathogen diversity and emergence risk. 
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RESEARCH NEEDS: 
 
Work on geographical areas that have received less attention would lead to a better understanding of the 
risk of disease emergence in these areas, particularly in Central and South America where there is high 
biodiversity and ongoing urban development, as well as in India, Africa and the Middle East (Han et al. 
2015, PNAS, Guégan et al. 2020, Env. Res. Let. ). 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
Although the origin of the virus causing the Covid-19 crisis is not fully established, the conditions 
surrounding the emergence of this epidemic are typical of this type of phenomenon: high biodiversity, 
exposure to infectious agents reinforced by the trade in live animals, high exposure through local or 
regional practices and customs, and enhanced vulnerability of dense populations with high poverty levels. 
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SHEET 4 
Are certain human populations more at risk? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
The risk of infection is determined by the combination of three components: hazard (the presence of 
microbes, reservoir hosts or vectors, and their association), exposure of individuals and communities, and 
vulnerability of individuals and populations. 
Hazard is determined by the occurrence of areas, often associated with biodiversity hotspots, where 
microbial agents, some of which may be pathogenic to humans, circulate (the concept of the enzootic 
cycle); exposure is determined by how often and to what extent populations are in contact with wildlife 
(see SHEET 3). For example, hunters are more exposed on an individual level to an infectious threat 
because of their practices (exposure within the community or occupational risk). 
Vulnerability is in part modulated by the genetic makeup of populations (neutral and adaptive diversity, 
Quintana Murci 2019, Cell). However, genetic background does not appear to be the most important 
factor determining infectious risk (difficulty in clearly quantifying the contribution of this component in 
risk estimations: values range between 6% and 24%, seldom more). Vulnerability is also influenced by 
physiological factors such as stress, physical condition (immunosuppression, co-infections, being over- or 
underweight, Dobnet and Kaser 2018, Clin Microbiol Infect)) and by the resident microbiota, which varies 
between populations and affects susceptibility to infection (Pfeiffer and Sonnenburg 2011, Front 
Microbiol). Vulnerability is also determined by the socio-economic organization of the group in question 
and the structure of their productive system with its various components (agriculture, hunting, gathering, 
fishing, exploitation of forest products). Their conception of health, their living space, their environment 
(determined by human density, access to water and food, forms of well-being and care, education, etc.), 
their mobility (in particular contact with urban environments), threats to their territories (gold mining, 
timber exploitation, deforestation, etc.), their status within society nationally but also their capacity, 
when possible, to organise themselves in the face of a health threat, as well as the frequent lack of 
adequate health services, all play a major role in their vulnerability or resistance. 
 
Depending on the evolution of human factors influencing the vulnerability and exposure of populations, 
risk areas may change. For example, the epidemic events observed in South East Asia are linked to the 
high concentration of conurbations combined with the presence of biodiversity hotspots. In the future, 
similar conditions could be found in Africa or Central America, for example, with the development of cities 
that are in contact with pathogen reservoir zones (microorganisms, not all of which are pathogenic at 
present) (Guégan et al. 2020, Env. Res. Let. ). 
 
Because of the persistence of transmissible diseases that perpetuate poverty, and in order to mobilise 
resources for the most vulnerable populations, the WHO has placed certain diseases on their "neglected 
tropical disease" (NTD) list, including several zoonotic diseases: T. solium cysticercosis, echinococcosis, 
leishmaniasis, rabies and the zoonotic form of African trypanosomiasis or sleeping sickness. Less formally, 
other zoonotic diseases (brucellosis, anthrax, bovine tuberculosis) are also considered as being neglected 
by other experts in the field. Finally, animal diseases should also be considered as being neglected given 
their socio-economic impact on vulnerable human populations (Roger et al. 2017, Plos NTD). 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
The risk level of a population can be mitigated or aggravated by local perceptions of the causes of the 
disease that generate a range of responses, by the breakdown of the socio-political, cultural and 
subsistence organization within these populations, and by changes in mobility (Buchillet 2016, in Erikson 
P. (ed.) Trophées : études éthnologiques, indigénistes et amazonistes offertes à Patrick Menget, vol. 2 : 
Guerre, chamanisme et rencontres interethniques). 
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LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
Research on alternatives to game consumption in populations that depend on it for food or socio-cultural 
practices should be carried out in order to fully apprehend the ecological, economic and socio-cultural 
dimensions of these practices. Studies need to discriminate between self-sufficiency practices and long-
distance trafficking and trade practices. 
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
Work on prevention measures aimed at reducing population exposure (relationship to the wild) and 
vulnerability (living conditions in the broadest sense) would help limit the risk for populations in contact 
with potential pathogens, but also limit the risk of epidemic or pandemic events that could result from 
these contacts, while taking into account cultural specificities. Although French laboratories are 
contributing to these fields and are recognised worldwide, research in anthropology, sociology and health 
economics, and in political science on the organisation of health systems (surveillance, care, etc.), in 
particular through multidisciplinary and multisectoral comparative studies, needs to be supported. It is 
important to study the relationship between populations and wildlife, in all its diversity and complexity. 
This relationship does not only concern the practices of hunting, consumption, etc., but also the 
knowledge that these populations have (or do not have) of wildlife and diseases. 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
In the case of Covid-19, although the origin of the virus is still uncertain, populations were exposed to the 
virus responsible for this disease before its emergence was discovered. This was also the case for the 
Ebola virus in central Africa, the Nipah virus in South East Asia and most likely for a very large number of 
cases. The measures taken by States worldwide have therefore focused on responding to the epidemic 
(containment measures, stopping population movements) rather than on prevention by reducing 
exposure (legislation against illegal hunting and live animal markets, prophylactic measures, etc.) or 
individual and collective vulnerability (increased protection measures and medical capacities, and 
educating on the risk factors as was done for the Nipah virus). 
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SHEET 5 
What roles can co-evolutionary processes between humans and pathogens play? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
As on most living things, pathogens have exerted (and still are exerting) major selective pressures on the 
human genome and on immunity genes in particular (Hill 1998, Ann Rev Immunol; Quach et al. 2016, Cell) 
throughout human evolution (Karlsson et al. 2014, Nat Rev Genet; Chen et al. 2018 Plos Pathogens). Our 
immune responses to current infectious agents are in part determined by our responses to past selective 
pressures, with either positive or negative effects (e.g. immunopathology, maladaptation to new 
pathogens, see Graham et al. 2005, Ann Rev Eco Evo Syst). In parallel, our immune systems, but also our 
behavioural and cultural responses, can potentially exert selection pressures on pathogens (Weinstein et 
al. 2011. Med. Hyp. ). 
 
Co-evolutionary processes take time (determined by mutation rates and generation time); they begin 
once transmission from animal to human is completed (we refer to this as spillover). In many cases, for 
example Ebola in West Africa, the pathogen evolves very slowly in humans and remains relatively stable. 
The virulence of newly emerged pathogens can be attributed to the absence of coevolution between 
humans and the infectious agent (e.g. symptoms caused by Hantavirus infections, Schonrich et al. 2008, 
Immunol Rev). Initial virulence seems to increase with the phylogenetic distance between humans and 
the animal host (Guth et al. 2019, Phil Trans, Longdon et al. 2005, Plos Pathogens). Co-evolutionary 
processes may lead to a decrease in pathogen virulence (the 'traditional wisdom' hypothesis, see May and 
Anderson 1983, Proc R Soc Lond B Biol Sci ; virulence/transmission trade-off), but also to its increase, 
when virulence and likelihood of transmission or competitiveness of the infectious agent are positively 
correlated, for example, due to short-term intra-host evolution (see for a review Levin 1996, EID) or to 
stochastic events associated with pathogen emergence (André and Hochberg 2005, Evolution). Thus, the 
tuberculosis agent M. tuberculosis seems to have evolved towards a potential for increased transmission 
and virulence despite a long history of coevolution with humans (Gagneux 2012, Phil Trans). Host changes 
may result in a breakdown ("disruption") of coevolution and thus favour the emergence of diseases with 
severe forms (Corvalan et al. 2019 Cancers; Jorgensen et al. 2019. Annu. Rev. Ecol. Evol. Syst.). 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
None identified at this stage. 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
Studies analyse animal-to-human transmissions where pathogens persist long enough to be detected. 
However, it is highly likely that many transmissions fail, for genetic/physiological reasons, or because non-
adaptation/adaptability prevent the spillover of wildlife pathogens into humans. Spillover success is more 
likely when its "cost" is mitigated, i.e. when the nutritional, immunological, etc., background in humans is 
weakened. 
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
Study the phylogeny of viruses to estimate the temporal and spatial changes in their genetic variability. 
Investigate the evolution of virulence in the field, even though this type of research is complicated by 
factors of heterogeneity (health system, population age structure, etc.). The link between health at the 
individual level and emerging infectious risk could be explored. Research also needs to focus on better 
understanding the spread of pathogens, the origin of disease emergence and its evolution in order to 
better predict and prevent the emergence and re-emergence of human infectious diseases (Jorgensen et 
al. 2019. Annu. Rev. Ecol. Evol. Syst.). 
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SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
We are faced here with a true emergence (i.e. a new virus, unknown to humans). There can be no short-
term co-evolutionary response on the human side of this interaction due to our long generation time 
(decades, on average) and the low selection pressure exerted by the virus (mortality mainly affects people 
who have already reproduced). The virus, however, has a much shorter generation time (a few days) and 
could theoretically mutate and be subject to selection pressures from the natural or medicalized immune 
system of humans or other animal species that may have served as intermediate hosts. It is worth noting 
the strong influence of genetic drift (i.e. evolution caused by random events) during disease emergence 
and pandemic events. 
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SHEET 6 
Are certain taxonomic groups more likely to cause zoonotic diseases? If so, why? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
Certain groups of animals seem more likely to cause zoonotic diseases: 
- Those that are genetically and physiologically close to humans (mammals - primates in particular - 
but also other homoeothermic vertebrates such as birds) (Davies and Pedersen, 2008, Procs Roy 
Soc B, Olival et al. 2017, Nature, Copper et al. 2012, Ecol Lett. ). 
- Species with a long history of cohabitation with humans: domestic animals (Suidae in particular), 
commensal species and game. The number of zoonotic viruses was found to increase with the 
age of domestication of a domestic species (Morand and Figuié 2016, QUAE eds) and with 
population abundance in mammals that have adapted to anthropized environments (Johnson et 
al. 2020, Proc Roy Soc B). 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
The link between species richness and the ability to harbour a greater diversity of pathogens remains 
controversial.  
According to Mollentze and Streicker (2020, PNAS), the number of viruses in different orders of mammals 
and birds is related to the number of species in that order. Moreover, the proportion of viruses that are 
zoonotic is homogeneous in different taxonomic orders of mammalian and bird reservoir hosts, and 
increases with the age of domestication of domestic species (Morand and Figuié 2016, Editions Quae). 
Thus, the number of observed zoonoses within animal orders increases with the species richness of the 
order. The number of zoonotic viruses within a species also scales positively with the abundance of that 
species (Johnson et al. 2020, Proc. R. Soc. B). 
The alternative view is that certain groups of animals are preferential hosts for certain categories of 
pathogens because of particular features in their genome, immune system, ecology, life traits, or 
physiology. This hypothesis has been put forward for chiropterans and other groups of mammals such as 
primates, carnivores and rodents (Locatelli and Peeters 2012, Nature Education Knowledge; Han et al. 
2015, PNAS; Olival et al. 2017, Nature; Schountz et al. 2017 Front immunol; Wells et al. 2019, GEB; 
Rossetto, 2020, PLos One; Luis et al. 2013, Procs). The following mammalian orders appear to harbour the 
highest proportion of zoonotic viruses: Rodentia, Chiroptera, primates, Artiodactyla, Carnivora, in 
descending order of importance (Han et al. 2016, Trends Parasitol.). 
 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
The particular interest given to certain taxa (chiropterans and rodents in particular) may cause a sampling 
bias, with over-representation of these taxa. These taxa are nonetheless important sources of zoonotic 
diseases. 
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
There is a need to understand entire biological communities and develop broad taxonomic sampling 
efforts as well as reintegrate the notion of “Pathocenosis” in training courses and research practice. 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
There is a lack of scientific data to date, apart from evidence of high sequence similarity of the virus (a 
Betacoronavirus) in humans and bats from China belonging to the genus Rhinolophus. The hypothesis of 
the role of an intermediate host such as the Malayan pangolin Manis javanica is plausible but remains to 
be demonstrated, as does the possibility of recombination mechanisms that may have occurred (Hassanin 
et al., 2020, Mammalia). 
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SHEET 7 
What do we know about the processes that enable different types of human pathogens to 
cross the species barrier? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
In the living world, in which organisms are ever-evolving and in constant interaction, life must be seen as 
a set of networks, not as separate compartments. The notion of barrier therefore paints a false picture, 
except for saying that it is there to be crossed. Although this cannot not be quantified, it is very likely that 
humans are very frequently exposed to infectious agents from wildlife, but that infection success is 
extremely low (Wood et al. 2012, Phil Trans, Morse et al. 2012, Lancet). 
The question of crossing the species barrier has been relatively well studied by British and North American 
researchers since 1995 (Woolhouse 1995, Vaccine, Antia et al. 2003, Nature etc.). This process involves 
different steps including cross-exposure to an infectious agent or contact between hosts, the capacity of 
the infectious agent to infect a new host, and possibly adaptation of the infectious agent to its new host, 
which may improve its capacity to jump from one host to another (see Parrish et al. 2008, Microb Mol Biol 
Rev for a review of the mechanisms). 
 
Spillover is easier between humans and primates because of their biological proximity; this is true for 
different types of pathogens (viruses, bacteria, parasitic worms, ectoparasites, etc.) (see SHEET 6, Wolfe 
et al. 1998, Emerg Infect Dis). It is also promoted by close contact, especially with commensal (Han et al. 
2015, PNAS, Davis et al. 2005, Vect Born Zoon Dis) and domestic species (Morand and Figuié 2016, 
Editions Quae). 
 
This phenomenon is facilitated at different levels (see Parrish et al. 2008, Microb Mol Biol Rev for details 
on the mechanisms): 
• Via ecological processes through enhanced contact or exposure, for instance in more fragmented 
landscapes (see Borremans 2019, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B) 
• Via cellular processes involving host receptors/anchor proteins of infectious agents (e.g. ACE2 
receptors for coronaviruses). On a finer scale, there may be a loss of genes or gene functions (e.g. 
the human pertussis bacterium, of zoonotic origin). Many bacteria acquire "gene cassettes" and 
bacterial plasmids, for example. 
• Via evolutionary processes involving the immune system and the genetic diversity of the 
potential host (the innate response could eliminate a large proportion of infectious agents 
crossing the host barrier), the genetic diversity of the infectious agent and its rate of evolution 
(mutation, recombination, re-assortment for viruses), etc.. Thus, RNA viruses have been 
identified as important pathogens that need to be monitored because of their high rate of 
evolution and their ability to adapt to new environments (Grenfell et al. 2004, Science). Some 
viruses replicate in the cell cytoplasm, not in the nucleus, and thus seem to be able to infect 
several species more easily (Pulliam et al., 2009, J Infectious Diseases). 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
The mechanisms underlying this phenomenon are relatively well-known for certain pathogens (e.g. RNA 
viruses), but remain more hypothetical for others. 
  
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
This issue is very complex and multifactorial. There have been theoretical studies on this subject but the 
need for field studies remains great. In particular, a complete understanding of the phenomenon, 
combining the analysis of the dynamics of the infectious agent within its animal reservoir and outside its 
reservoir (survival in the environment, dispersal), is often lacking. 
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An analysis of the interaction between exposure, infectious dose and host immune response would help 
us better understand spillover events (Plowright et al. 2017, Nat Rev Microb). 
 
The study of unsuccessful spillovers could also be very informative. To this end, a more exhaustive survey 
of the microbial agents circulating in wildlife (Anthony et al. 2014, mBio) would make it possible to better 
identify the characteristics of zoonotic agents that have crossed the animal-human ‘barrier’, compared to 
non-zoonotic agents that have not (yet) crossed this ‘barrier’. 
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
Research in evolutionary biology and modelling is needed to better address these issues. Understanding 
how the various barriers (exposure, human-infectious agent interaction, etc.) are linked and how the 
spatio-temporal variability of these barriers (seasonal fluctuations in pathogen dynamics, spatial 
variations in human population behaviour, etc.) affects spillover, would improve the development of 
approaches dedicated to modelling the ecology of zoonotic risk (Plowright et al. 2017, Nat Rev Microb). 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
Covid-19 most likely originated from contact between humans and wild animals carrying the SARS-CoV-2 
virus or a closely related form. On the 12th of March 2020, the journal Nature published two scientific 
articles written by Chinese research groups that indicated, based on high genetic sequence similarity, that 
bats were potential reservoirs of the SARS-CoV-2 virus (Wu et al. 2020, Nature, Zhou et al. 2020, Nature). 
A sequence of the virus found in the bat species Rhinolophus affinis was 96% identical to that of SARS-
CoV-2 (Zhou et al. 2020, Nature). Other animals could also have contributed to the emergence of this 
zoonosis (Wu et al. 2020, Nature); the hypothesis that consumption of the Malayan pangolin, Manis 
javanica, may have played a part seems relevant but still needs to be confirmed (Lam et al. 2020, Nature). 
Recombination has been observed in other coronaviruses, which has allowed them to adapt to new hosts. 
For example, the virus responsible for SARS in 2003 lost 29 nucleotides when it passed from civets to 
humans (Guan et al. 2003, Science). 
In addition, work (virology, cell biology, phylogeny, etc.) is being carried out on the interaction between 
the coronavirus S protein and ACE2 receptors, which are the entry points for coronaviruses in host cells (Li 
et al. 2003, Nature, Li et al. 2006, J Virol). This should make it possible to better predict which 
coronaviruses can cross the species barrier (bats/other wild animals, domestic animals or humans) (Liu et 
al. 2020, J Med Virol, Zhou et al. 2020, Nature). 
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SHEET 8 
Are intermediate hosts always critical for the emergence of zoonotic diseases? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
The intermediate host is an animal species that may allow the infectious agent to become pathogenic to 
humans, may allow it to multiply or may increase the exposure of humans to that infectious agent. 
Intermediate host species have specific life traits (diet, immune system, synanthropy - the adaptation of 
species to anthropized environments -, etc.) that allow it to act as a “go-between” reservoir species and 
humans, which would otherwise have rarely come into contact. They are also species that live in close 
proximity to human populations (livestock, and domestic and commensal animals). These hosts have an 
amplifying role by increasing exposure or through their ability to carry, multiply and transmit the 
pathogen. For many diseases, domestic or commensal animals (i.e. animals that live close to humans, 
such as rats, some insects) act as intermediate hosts (e.g. pigs in the Nipah virus epidemic). These animal 
communities, through their contact with humans, play an important and recurrent role in transmitting or 
‘humanizing’ infectious agents. 
However, zoonotic diseases do not always have an intermediate host and can be transmitted directly 
from the reservoir to humans. Examples include rabies, brucellosis, tuberculosis, Ebola, hantavirus fevers, 
leptospirosis. Furthermore, several species may associate to form a multi-host system (Webster et al. 
2017, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B). 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
None identified to date. 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
 Certain important functions are under-studied, in particular the role of omnivorous species (pigs, rats) in 
trophic transmissions, but also in airborne transmissions (e.g. Nipah) and transmissions in anthropized 
environments. 
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
The relative importance of these intermediate hosts, or host networks, in increasing exposure, increasing 
the volume of infectious agents that come into contact with humans, and for the evolution of these 
infectious agents into "variants" with greater a capacity for human infection and human-to-human 
transmission should be clarified. 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
According to Cui et al. (2018, Nature Reviews Microbiology), the majority of coronaviruses that are 
transmitted to humans have an intermediate host (llama, civet, dromedary, pigs). This may be the case for 
SARS-CoV-2, but this remains to be scientifically demonstrated.  The cramped conditions of captivity (of 
animals such as the Malayan pangolin Manis javanica) that lead to stressed, immunocompromised 
animals should be taken into account as a facilitator of transmission (Lam et al. 2020, Nature, Hassanin et 
al. 2020, Mammalia). 
 
We lack hindsight to rule out the possible role of carnivores in disease transmission. Leroy et al. (2020, 
One Health) report cases of probable contamination of felines in an American zoo as well as sporadic 
cases of contamination of pets. The French national institute for health, food, environment and work 
security (ANSES) has indicated that experimental infections demonstrate the receptivity of some animal 
species to the virus (ferrets, hamsters and to a lesser extent cats, from human transmission, see ANSES 
Opinion Referral No. 2020-SA-0037). Taking these new elements into account, ANSES nonetheless 
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considers that there is currently no scientific evidence that show that domestic animals (livestock and 
pets) play an epidemiological role in the spread of SARS-CoV-2. 
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SHEET 9 
What are the evidence-based links between zoonotic diseases and biodiversity loss? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
There is rising evidence that global environmental change, loss of biodiversity and its associated 
regulatory services and the emergence or increase in prevalence of infectious diseases are correlated. 
The risk of zoonotic disease emergence and spread may be augmented by the erosion of biodiversity (at 
the species or genetic level) through ecological (habitat destruction and fragmentation, food chain 
disruption, pollution, stress), epidemiological (dilution/amplification phenomena associated with the 
disruption/reorganisation of ecological communities), adaptive (behavioural changes, the concept of 
synanthropic species – wild species that have adapted to anthropized environments) and evolutionary 
(disruption of co-evolutionary links between hosts and pathogens) factors. 
 
Bibliography: Patz et al. 2000, Int. J. Parasiol; Suzan et al. 2009, Plos One; Keesing et al. 2010, Nature, 
Young et al. 2014, PNAS, Morand et al. 2014, Plos One, Aguirre 2017, ILAR J. Nava et al. 2017, ILAR J. , 
Ecke et al. 2017, Ecol. & Evol. Interface, J. R. Soc. Interface, McMahon et al. 2018, Zoonose Public Health, 
Ellwanger et al. 2020, An. Acad. Bras. Cienc, Rohr et al. 2020, Nature Ecol. & evol. 
 
For more details, see fact sheets 10 (deforestation), 11 (infrastructure), 12 (urban development) and 22 
(maintenance of species biodiversity and the dilution effect), which describe specific aspects of the link 
between zoonotic diseases and biodiversity loss and the underlying eco-evolutionary processes. 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
There is no particular dissensus within the biodiversity science community. 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
Criticisms highlight a lack of evidence regarding the potential mechanisms linking biodiversity and disease. 
This needs to be addressed, while bearing in mind that it is difficult to carry out experiments at these 
levels. 
In addition, it is important to distinguish the consequences of environment and habitat destruction from 
those of habitat conversion (forests converted for crop production or plantations). 
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
Further research should be carried out: 
• To better understand the ecological and evolutionary processes that can explain observed 
patterns. 
• To assess the link between reduced population size in declining species and the risk of 
transmitting their microorganisms to domestic animals and humans. 
• At the community level, and within the framework of the interaction between biocenoses and 
pathocenoses (Johnson et al. 2015, Science, Vayssier-Taussat et al. 2014, Front Cell Infect 
Microb). 
• Integrating the diversity and role of microbiota (Trevelline et al. 2020, Mol Ecol,  Trevelline et al. 
2019, Procs Roy Soc). 
• To assess the influence of different spatial scales on observed patterns (see Rohr et al. 2020, 
Nature Ecol. & evol.) for a detailed review of research perspectives and Johnson et al. (2015, 
Science) who argue in favour of community ecology). 
• In historical ecology, to integrate the history and dynamics of biodiversity loss in the analysis of 
present day biodiversity patterns. 
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SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
To date, there is a complete lack of scientific knowledge regarding the link between biodiversity and the 
emergence of Covid-19. However, it has been previously reported that serious damage to biodiversity, in 
particular to the integrity of ecosystems, in China has impacted the population dynamics/viability of 
certain species including bats. 
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SHEET 10 
What are the evidence-based links between zoonotic diseases and deforestation (and the 
development of agriculture and monospecific plantations)? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
It is widely acknowledged that there is a link between deforestation and the increase in the number of 
zoonotic diseases in Asia, Africa and South America. 
However, a number of explanatory factors related to deforestation could underlie this observation: 
- Factors that are likely to reinforce the effects of deforestation (climate change and extreme 
climatic events, changing seasonal and rainfall patterns), affect human populations and 
potentially promote the proliferation of vectors, 
- The effects of deforestation on landscapes and community ecology: reduction of biodiversity, 
especially predator diversity, disruption of community functioning (trophic interactions), habitat 
loss and fragmentation, 
- Human activities associated with deforestation: increased human presence in forest habitats, 
particularly via communication infrastructures, and the development of hunting, poaching and 
bushmeat consumption, 
- Changes at the interface between human populations, wild animals and domestic animals: 
increased human-wild animal and domestic animal-wild animal interactions at urban-forest 
interfaces and increased spillover. 
There is also a consensus that land use changes related to agriculture, monospecific plantations, 
extractive activities, the development of hydroelectric and road infrastructures and urban development 
have resulted in an increase in the number of zoonotic disease outbreaks in previously forested areas, and 
more generally in areas previously unaltered by human activity. 
 
Bibliography: Arevalo-Herrera et al. 2012. Acta Tropica, Rebaudo et al. 2014, Plos Neg. Trop. Dis. Morand 
et al, 2014, Plos One, Alarcón de Noya and Gonzalez, 2015, Acta Tropica, Ajesh et al, 2017, Zoon. Pub. 
Health, Morris et al, 2016, Sci. Adv. Nava et al. 2017 ILAR J. Erazo et al. 2019, Parasite Vectors, Ellwanger 
et al. 2020, An. Acad. Bras. Cienc, Olivero et al. 2017, Scient. Rep. Rulli et al, 2017, Scient. Rep. Singh et al, 
2019, Vet. Quarterly. 
 
The link between Ebola virus disease outbreaks in Africa and deforestation events is particularly clear, and 
illustrates the link between deforestation and the increase in the number of disease outbreaks (Olivero et 
al., 2017, Scient. Rep., Rulli et al. , 2017, Scient. Rep.). Studies on the Nipah virus in Asia also illustrate how 
behavioural changes in species whose habitats have been disturbed or destroyed due to deforestation 
can lead to the transmission of pathogens to domestic animals and humans (Singh et al. , 2019, Vet. 
Quarterly). 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
There is no dissensus within the biodiversity science community on the link, globally, between 
deforestation and zoonotic disease emergence. It should be noted, however, that there are a few 
examples where the effect of deforestation on infectious risk may be positive, negative or absent 
depending on the situation (Young et al. 2017 Phil Trans.). 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
There is a lack of case studies linking the emergence of pathogens, deforestation and the development of 
monospecific plantations. 
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NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
Multiply the number of specific case studies, clarify the role of monospecific plantations, determine the 
specific effects of deforestation versus human intrusion to exploit resources. 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
No specific study has been carried out nor is any knowledge available to date. Deforestation is still 
ongoing in several Chinese provinces and neighbouring countries (notably Vietnam and Laos), where hosts 
of the viruses currently presumed to cause Covid-19 (fruit bats and pangolins) are found. 
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SHEET 11 
What are the evidence-based links between zoonotic diseases and the development of 
human infrastructure (roads, etc.)? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
The unprecedented development of human infrastructure, in particular roads, dams, infrastructure 
related to mining activities and air and sea transport, is having a considerable impact on the environment. 
We can distinguish three major roles of infrastructure: 
1) as a process that facilitates contact between human populations and zoonotic reservoirs, via the 
degradation of ecosystems (trophic interactions disrupted by landscape fragmentation, reduced 
functional connectivity), increased human incursion and activity in the habitats of pathogen 
reservoir species and by facilitating the movement of these species, 
2) as a process  that facilitates the spread of zoonotic diseases via the movement of reservoir hosts, 
intermediate hosts or human populations (human-to-human transmission), and their evolution 
into epidemics or pandemics via the movement of humans, their pets or domestic animals, or the 
movement of invasive species that are reservoirs of zoonotic agents (e.g. rats and mice), 
3) as a process that allows the entry of new human groups (gold miners and others) that are likely to 
spread new pathogens to local populations. 
 
The more connected a region is, in terms of the amount of infrastructure and the number of movements, 
either over long (air or sea) and short (roads or waterways) distances, the more likely it is to play a role in 
the spread of emerging pathogens with epidemic or pandemic potential and itself be the target of an 
outbreak. The establishment or expansion of transport networks can therefore facilitate the emergence 
and spread of zoonotic diseases. 
 
Bibliography:  Hosseini et al. Plos One, 2020, Maheu-Giroux et al. 2010, Acta Trop. , Cesario et al. 2011, 
Global Bioethics, Marsot et al. 2013, Plos One, Lucaccioni et al. 2016, Plos One, Puckett et al. 2016, Proc. 
R. Soc. B, Laurance and Arrea 2017, Science, Lana et al. 2017, Plos Neg. Too much. Say. Da Costa et al. 
2018, Plos One, Djemai,2018, J. Health Econ. Douine et al. 2019, Malar. J. Ellwanger et al. 2020, An. Acad. 
Bras. Cienc. 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
No dissensus within the biodiversity science community. 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
No major knowledge gap; the topic is well researched. 
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
Vulnerable human populations in relative isolation are brutally connected to the rest of the world. 
Moreover, a major lever of development has been the diversification of human activities that impact the 
environment (building dams, roads - e.g. the opening of roads in the Amazon in the 1970s, the advances 
of agricultural colonization fronts as another form of infrastructure, but also the construction of railways, 
for example the Madeira-Mamoré railway at the beginning of the 20th century), which justify the need to 
develop socio-eco-epidemiological approaches more widely (Benchimol et Silva 2008, His Cien Saude-
Manguinhos). 
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SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
If wild intermediate host species, consumed as bushmeat or used in traditional pharmacopoeia, are 
implicated, it will be interesting to identify their national, regional and international supply routes 
("pangolin trafficking routes"). 
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SHEET 12 
What are the evidence-based links between zoonotic diseases and urbanization? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
We are currently observing a major development of the urban network, especially in developing countries 
and particularly in Africa (which has the highest rate of increase of urbanization in the world) and Asia, 
leading to major changes to pre-existing natural environments (buildings, roads, modification of 
waterways, vegetation reduction and fragmentation, constraints on river systems, heat islands, 
anthropogenic pollution). In a context of high human population density and often degraded health 
conditions for a large proportion of city dwellers in developing countries, zoonotic health risks are 
increasing. These risks are associated with rodents and insects, some species or populations of which 
thrive with the availability of food resources linked to a lack of waste management in many cities in 
developing countries and to new urban nature management practices (composting, for example) in 
developed countries, and with vectors that find suitable habitats. Urban centres can be both sites of 
disease emergence (e.g. arbovirosis, but also human trypanosomiasis) and of outbreaks where diseases 
spread because of high population densities (Ebola in Africa, plague in Madagascar, typhus in South East 
Asia, leptospirosis in Brazil, Covid-19 in China and then in many other countries). 
A major distinction must be made between city centres and peri-urban areas where there is a transition 
between urban and rural land uses and which are more likely to be infection sites, in particular due to the 
presence of a great diversity of farm animals that are likely to come into contact with wildlife (SARS in 
Vietnam). 
Some recent trends, such as 'urban greening' (especially if green spaces are connected to outlying natural 
areas), eco-tourism and trends that promote increased contact with nature could in some situations 
facilitate contact with infectious forest agents, in particular those that are transmitted in some countries 
by non-human primates (e.g. the resurgence of yellow fever and malaria in Brazil, but also Lyme’s disease 
in temperate zones). In no way does this outweigh the benefits for human well-being of reconnecting with 
nature, or the benefits of increasing green spaces and wooded areas in cities. 
 
Bibliography: Tshimungu et al. 2010, Méd. et Mal. Infect. Weaver, 2013, Trends Microbio. Tong et al. 
2015, Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health, Saksena et al. 2017, AsiaPacific Issues, Toledo et al. 2017, Rev. 
Saude Publica, Possas et al. 2018, Mem. Inst. Oswaldo Cruz, Munster et al. 2018, New Eng. J. Medicine, 
Cunha et al. 2019, Scient. Rep. Ahmed et al. 2019, Environ Urban, Oliveira et al. 2015, Rev. Inst. Med. Too 
much. Paulo. 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
No dissensus within the biodiversity science community. 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
Little is known about the emergence of pathogens in urban environments from domestic animals, urban 
livestock and small synanthropic mammals. 
What is the role of ubiquitous and invasive species that thrive in urban environments and are not 
regulated by predators, especially in developing countries where promiscuity with humans is very high? 
What impact do control practices (vector control, rat control, etc.) and urban pollution (air pollution, light 
pollution, Navara and Nelson, 2007, J. Pineal Res. Bedrosian et al. 2011, Biol. Lett.  Kernbach et al. 2019, 
Proc. R. Soc. B.) have on diseases? Are interactions between infectious agents, reservoirs and vectors, 
pathosystems and humans different in urban environments? How can we reconcile the importance of 
biodiversity with the need to minimize health risks, including in dramatically underdeveloped areas where 
priorities are far removed from these concerns even though the risk is potentially higher? 
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NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
Research is needed to fill the gaps in our knowledge as listed above. Studies on urban biodiversity and 
ecology are needed, probably making a distinction between cities in "developed" and "developing" 
countries, and examining the special case of cities in emerging countries. The role of biodiversity in the 
control of disease vectors, particularly by their predators (regulation service), should also be studied. 
There is a need to study the different ways urban populations apprehend nature (the different views on 
animals, waste management, forms of consumption, etc.), and to continue developing studies on the 
relationship to urban managed nature and associated practices (new uses of nature). The link between 
zoonotic diseases and urbanization should be analysed through the prism of socioeconomic inequalities, 
in city centres and at the city/periphery interface where the link between health and the environment is 
likely to be different, and therefore where quite different infectious processes could be at work. 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
The question of the role of wildlife markets is central to understanding the Covid-19 crisis, but scientific 
data are lacking to date. Are transmissions from humans to domestic and wild animals possible (human to 
animal transmissions have been reported for various carnivores, e.g. dogs, cats, mink)? If so, could these 
animals constitute possible sources that may cause an “epidemic rebound”? 
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SHEET 13 
Is there a link between the increase in the number of zoonotic diseases, climate change 
and exceptional climatic events? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
Climate change is one of the factors that affect species and therefore certain zoonotic diseases. The 
behaviour, activity level, range, and the biotic and abiotic environment of certain species, including those 
carrying pathogens, may be modified by climate change (Alkishe et al. 2017, PLOS One). Several studies 
show that climate change can impact the transmission of pathogens by influencing their reproduction or 
survival, or impact their hosts by altering their distribution and mortality rate, or by changing the mode of 
transmission (Booth 2018, Advances in Parasitology, Khan et al. 2019, Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health).  
However, the proportion of climate-sensitive pathogens and their characteristics are not known (McIntyre 
et al. 2017, Sci Rep), although four infectious diseases have been identified as climate-sensitive in 
northern regions (borreliosis, tick-borne encephalitis, bluetongue disease and fasciolosis, Omazic et al. 
2019, Acta Vet Scand). In some cases, favourable climatic conditions for the vector and host are 
expanding with climate change (Lord et al. 2018, PLOS Medicine) or are expected to do so in the future 
(Thomassen et al. 2013, PLOS One, Shiravand et. al. 2019, J Dis Emerg Res). 
Viruses and bacteria that have been trapped for thousands or millions of years in the ice can reappear as 
the permafrost thaws (Revich and Podolnaya, 2011, Global Earth Action, Revich et al. 2012, Int. J. Circum. 
Health). 
Indirectly, climate change is correlated with a set of factors that are more directly related to the risk of 
zoonotic emergence such as deforestation (Thomassen et al. 2013, PLOS One), the disturbance of soils 
and their microbial communities (Combe 2019, Emerging Microbes & Infections), and floods (Boyce et al. 
2016, The Journal of Infectious Diseases). These factors may elevate the risk of zoonosis by increasing 
human population exposure or vulnerability, which are considered to be increasing according to 
assessments by the IPBES (2019, IPBES Secretariat) and the IPCC (IPCC 2019). 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
Despite the undeniable influence of climate change on biodiversity and its functioning, dynamics and 
evolution, no causal link has been established between climate change and the multiplication of 
zoonoses, although the literature notes a parallel aggravation of these two phenomena. Some studies 
predict that the effects of climate change are expected to be more severe in developing countries where 
the difficulties related to a challenging socio-economic and political environment are exacerbated by a 
lack of epidemiological studies on zoonotic diseases (Naicker 2011, Arch of Clin Micro). However, a review 
of recent modelling studies shows there is no consensus on the impact of future climate variations on 
mosquito-borne diseases (Franklinos et al. 2019, Infectious diseases).  
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
Coupling climate and epidemiological models of zoonotic infectious diseases remains a challenge, 
particularly because of the complexity of merging these models and their data (Bartlow et al. 2019, Vet 
Sci). Moreover, studies predicting the effects of climate change on the risk of vector-borne diseases tend 
to underestimate these effects by considering only the direct effects of climate on the ecology of a 
disease, while omitting the more indirect effects of climate change on the ability of societies to control 
and prevent these diseases (Odgen 2017, FEMS Microbiology Letters). 
 
RESEARCH NEEDS: 
 
The link could be established on a case-by-case basis, however this requires being able to determine the 
distributional ecology of any species involved in pathogen transmission, define the environmental 
conditions required for transmission and project this ecological niche onto geography (Estrada-Peña et al. 
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2014, Trends in Parasitology). The study of the geographical displacement of disease emergence could 
provide answers to this question. 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
The lack of data available to date on the origin of the Covid-19 crisis makes it impossible at present to link 
this specific event to particular climatic variables. 
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SHEET 14 
What are the evidence-based links between zoonotic diseases and the development of 
bushmeat consumption and wildlife trafficking associated with traditional pharmacopoeia? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
The link between bushmeat consumption and trade and emerging infectious diseases has been 
established in several cases (such as the shift from SIV to HIV, Ebola and SARS) (Karesh et al., 2005, Emerg 
Infect Dis, Swift et al. 2007, EcoHealth). The number of zoonoses related to bushmeat consumption is 
believed to be currently underestimated (Gomez and Aguirre 2008, Ann N Y Acad Sci, Kurpiers et al. 2016, 
Problematic Wildlife). The bushmeat chain poses a greater risk than the local meat chain (in the way 
carcasses are processed, meat is stored and consumed, etc.). However, bushmeat trade participants and 
consumers remain poorly informed about the health risks or do not comply with health management 
measures, thus extending the risk of infection to the entire meat chain (from hunter to consumer) 
(Greatorex et al. 2016, Plos One, LeBreton et al. 2006, An Cons, Kamins et al. 2015, EcoHealth). The 
bushmeat trade tends to be organized regionally in large urban markets (Edderai and Dame 2006, Oryx), 
and is now expanding internationally via air and sea trade routes (Brown 2004, Rev Sci Tech, Temmam et 
al. 2017, Transbound Emerg Dis). To meet this demand, wild game from a wide range of species is sold in 
very large volumes (Chaber et al. 2010, Cons Lett, Cronin et al. 2015, Plos One). These factors (high 
volume and diversity of species involved, high human density) provide favourable conditions for the 
emergence and transmission of pathogens (Karesh and Noble 2009, Mount Sinaï J Of Medecine). 
However, the most important factor seems to be direct contact with wild animals when hunting, holding 
animals captive (sometimes) and preparing carcasses for the bushmeat trade. Stress conditions associated 
with the capture and holding of animals could also increase the risk of pathogen transmission. 
The risks associated with traditional pharmacopoeia are reduced once living organisms have been caught 
and handled, because products are often highly processed (packaged, cooked or dried, reduced to 
powder, or only specific parts are processed). 
 
Additional literature: Narat et al. 2017, EcoHealth; Nahar et al. 2020, EcoHealth, Kolodziej-Sobocinska and 
Miniuk 2018, Medycyna weterynaryjna, Mwangi et al. 2016, African J. of Wildlife Research, Greatorex et 
al. 2016, PLOS One,  Nauman et al. 2017, in Trends in game meat hygiene. 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
The traditional dimension of these activities has been questioned. The development and/or globalisation 
of these practices potentially scale up their impact; in particular, an increase in volume and rate of 
resource exchange may increase the number of pathogens. These commercial bushmeat chains can also 
weaken local populations by competing with them for their food. 
 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
Practices that may cause zoonoses, other than the consumption of bushmeat, are harder to investigate: 
taming wild species, consuming the same fruits (cultivated or wild), sharing habitats and having contact 
with body fluids and excreta (Narat et al. 2017, EcoHealth, Muehlenbein 2017, Am Journal of Phys Anthr). 
The trade in exotic pets, in particular the trade in new “pet” species to supply an increasingly frantic 
market, poses a real threat of introducing new microbial agents, including human pathogens, as was the 
case with the Monkeypox virus in Atlanta in the early 2000s (Smith et al. 2017, EcoHealth).  
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
Research using economic and ethno-ecological approaches (in particular, the study of communities that 
practice hunting and wild game "preparation") could provide valuable insights. Systematic (i.e. non-
targeted) virological and serological screening of animals sold on markets could provide a better estimate 
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of the risk. Increased surveillance of the main platforms for wildlife trade in cities could be an effective 
strategy to prevent the risk of disease emergence. 
 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
As the precise circumstances of the emergence of the coronavirus causing the Covid-19 outbreak have not 
yet been established, bushmeat consumption cannot be implicated with any certainty at this stage, 
although the latest data suggest that pangolin, which is intensively consumed in China and South East 
Asia, could be a potential intermediate host for SARS-CoV-2 (Xiao et al. 2020, Nature; (Hassanin et al., 
2020, Mammalia). 
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SHEET 15 
Is it possible to generalise the mechanisms of interaction between livestock, the 
environment and health? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
In many pathosystems, there are frequent interactions between wild animals, domestic animals and 
humans. The passage of a pathogen from one of these compartments to another is often aided by local 
environmental and cultural factors, as the following examples show: 
 
The case of avian influenza 
There appears to be two types of mechanisms for the emergence and spread of this disease in this 
pathosystem (Dhingra 2018, Front. Vet. Sci.): first, in countries where there has been a shift from 
backyard to intensive poultry production systems (characterized by multiple circulating viruses, multiple 
host species, frequent contact at live bird markets, limited biosecurity and frequent vaccination 
campaigns that impose selection pressures that lead to the emergence of new viral strains (through 
recombinant mechanisms). Thus, in these countries, family-run backyard poultry farms pose a greater risk 
than industrial farms. For example, studies of H5N1 avian influenza in Thailand, which affected 
approximately 1,700 small backyard poultry farms, have shown that the disease was maintained locally by 
chicken collectors who moved from farm to farm to take chickens to the local slaughterhouse (Paul et al. 
2011, Acta Trop.). Studies of poultry houses in India and China have shown that it is the medium-sized 
poultry houses (and not the intensive farms) that increase the epidemic risk as a result of contact 
between semi-intensively raised birds and wild birds. The smaller the farm, the less densely populated it 
is, and because the risk of disease emergence and establishment is density-dependent, less densely 
populated farms are less likely to pose a risk. Management in these regions should therefore focus on the 
size of family farms so that they do not become too large (it is in fact both a problem of frequency of 
contact and density dependence). 
In developed countries, this risk is correlated with intensive farming as demonstrated by Dhingra et al. 
(2018, Front Vet. Sci.). Indeed, the vast majority of outbreaks have occurred on poultry farms located in 
areas with high poultry density. Of the 41 documented cases, only two occurred on rural backyard farms, 
and even these outbreaks occurred in regions of intensive poultry production (Italy in 1997 and France in 
2015).  
 
The case of the Nipah virus epidemic  
The epidemiological investigation showed that the 1997 outbreak in pigs and humans originated on a 
large intensive pig farm in northern Malaysia where Nipah virus-infected fruit bats came to feed on fruit 
trees planted around the farm. The virus spread to susceptible pigs through their consumption of fruit 
contaminated by bat saliva and urine. The spread of infection between pigs was facilitated by the high 
density of pigs on the farm and the high number of pig farms in the area, and by the transportation of pigs 
between farms to the main epidemic area in southern Malaysia. Pigs then served as amplifying hosts for 
human infection. Nearly all human cases came into contact with pigs; there is no evidence of direct bat-
to-human or human-to-human transmission (Kurup 2002, IDCP,  Jones et al, 2012, PNAS). 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
The interactions between agriculture and the environment are complex and difficult to generalise from 
one system to another. 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
Interdisciplinary research in agriculture and health is rare. 
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NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
The evolution of zoonotic risk within the context of greener farming practices (e.g. where animals are 
more in contact with the outside world and thus with wildlife) also needs to be explored. 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
Too recent, no evidence available to date. 
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SHEET 16 
What is the link between zoonotic diseases and the development of large-scale livestock 
farming, the reduction in the number of farmed species and the genetic homogenization of 
these species? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
Numerous studies have established a link between the risk of infection and the intensification of livestock 
production. There seems to be consensus on several known risk factors: 
- close spatial coexistence of livestock and wildlife; 
- animal crowding and the hypothesis that an increase in human, crop and livestock densities has 
the potential to increase both the incidence and severity of infectious diseases (Rohr 2019, 
Nature Sustainability); 
- loss of genetic diversity in livestock species; 
- stressful farming conditions. 
In factory farms, however, biosecurity measures are easier to implement and reduce the risk of infection 
but are probably not the global standard.  
 
Like human populations, livestock/poultry populations have increased exponentially in recent decades. 
Compared to wild mammal and bird populations, they constitute a much bigger and thus more favourable 
compartment for infectious outbreaks, especially with the development of large-scale transportation of 
animal products and live animals (Trovão and Nelson, 2020, Plos Path.). 
Intensive farming is characterised by high density and stress, and low genetic diversity. However, the 
implementation of biosecurity measures reduces the access of pathogens to these farms. Emergence risk 
is therefore less frequent, but when emergence does occur, disease can spread rapidly due to a 
combination of these vulnerability factors (density, stress and low genetic diversity) (Drew et al. 2011, Rev 
Sci Tech). The persistence of viruses is also sometimes observed on intermediate-sized farms (Hosseini et 
al. 2013, PLOS One). 
Moreover, many industrial farms produce a single species with reduced genetic diversity, which increases 
the chances of runaway propagation of a pathogen in the event of an emergence. 
In past avian influenza epidemics, for instance, the role of wildlife in the spread of the disease has always 
been ruled out (Awada et al. , 2018, Trans. Emerg. Dis.): amplification occurred on poultry farms. 
 
This phenomenon is probably better studied in crop pathogens, and strategies to alleviate the risks of 
disease outbreaks associated with monocultures and intensive farming are starting to be put in place (use 
of different rice varieties in China, for example). 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
In the case of avian influenza, it appears that the effect of genetic homogenization has not been 
investigated. 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
Human societies that do not keep livestock but raise young wild animals as pets have received little 
attention. 
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
The links between agriculture, the intensification of animal and plant production and health, in all its 
dimensions, must be studied on a global scale. For many diseases, there is a serious lack of research and 
evidence. 
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SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
Too recent, no evidence available to date. 
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SHEET 17 
What is the risk posed by human epidemics to wild species (e.g. primates) and pets? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
There are many examples of pathogens that have been transmitted from humans to domestic animals, 
pets or wildlife, including marine mammals and Antarctic birds. The spread of antibiotic-resistant strains 
of Staphylococcus aureus of human origin to great apes, and more generally to primates, is a classic 
example. Great apes are also subject to outbreaks of measles and various respiratory infections caused by 
viruses of human origin. Increased interaction between humans and wildlife can lead to complex 
interactions between anthroponotic and zoonotic transmission processes, as is the case for Listeria 
infections in American black bears and Plasmodium infections in humans and gorillas. In the case of the 
Ebola virus, the natural reservoir is still not identified, but it appears that humans and apes may be 
exposed to the pathogen within their respective environments. Ecological disturbances of anthropogenic 
origin, including simplification of communities, introduction of invasive alien species, and growing human 
intrusion into preserved areas (e.g. eco-tourism) may facilitate the transmission of pathogens from 
humans to wildlife. 
 
Bibliography: Acosta-Jamett et al. 2010, Prev. Vet. Med.  Prugnolle et al. 2010, PNAS, Medina-Vogel 2013, 
Microb. Spectrum. Baily et al. 2015, Mol. Ecol. Schaumburg et al. 2015, Clin. Microbiol. Infect. Leendertz 
et al. 2017, Mam. Rev. 2017, Grützmacher et al. 2016, Am. J. Primatol. Scully et al. 2018, Emer. Inf. 
diseases, Parsons et al. 2019, Microb. Biotechnology. 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
No dissensus within the biodiversity science community. 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
The impact of pets on the transmission of pathogens to wildlife needs to be better assessed. 
It is important to be aware of the bias associated with relying solely on the similarity of molecular 
sequences. 
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
Accurately assess the reality of anthroponotic transmissions. 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
Cases of pets (cats and dogs) and wild felines (tigers and lions) in captivity contaminated with SARS-CoV-2 
have recently been reported. These cases suggest the possibility of contamination of pets or zoo animals 
by owners or caregivers. Further studies should be conducted to better estimate the risk of transmitting 
the virus to pets and the subsequent risk that infected pets could in turn be a source of infection for 
humans (Leroy et al. 2020, One Health). 
For a recent comprehensive review of pathogen transmission from humans to non-human primates, see 
Devaux et al. 2019, Front. Pub. Health. 
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SHEET 18 
Should we develop zoonotic disease prediction methods (and models), and on what basis, 
or should we prioritise the monitoring of weak signals of potential zoonoses? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
Different types of models and methods for predicting zoonotic risk exist, and are used for making 
geographical predictions (identifying where zoonotic agents are likely to emerge and circulate) and for 
identifying potential reservoirs and infectious agents. However, pathogen emergence must be 
distinguished from disease emergence because there are many pathogens in wildlife that are potentially 
dangerous to humans (see the PREDICT programme, USAID), but this does not necessarily mean that a 
disease will develop into an epidemic (or pandemic). 
Mapping areas at risk of emergence, i.e. where hazard, exposure and vulnerability of populations overlap, 
makes it possible to locate this risk on a relatively fine scale. This risk is greater in tropical forest areas, 
areas with high mammal species richness and areas linked to variables related to changes in land use 
(natural habitats converted into agricultural land) (Han et al. 2015, PNAS, Han et al. 2016, Trends 
Parasitol, Allen et al. 2017, Nature Communications, Guégan et al. 2020, Env. Res. Let.). 
Predictions are made (i) on the zoonotic potential of certain microorganisms based on meta-analyses of 
their biological characteristics (Pulliam 2008, EcoHealth, Olival et al. 2017, Nature) as well as molecular 
and experimental analyses (Russell et al. 2012, Science) and (ii) on the range of potential reservoirs of 
zoonotic agents using meta-analyses (Mollentze and Streicker 2020, PNAS) or machine-learning 
algorithms (Babayan et al. 2018, Science). 
Combining these predictive approaches may be useful for effectively targeting the surveillance of 
geographic areas and organisms (Morse et al. 2012, Lancet). Spatial multi-criteria assessment methods 
are useful for prioritising areas for surveillance, particularly in areas where epidemiological data are 
difficult to collect (Aenishaenslin et al. 2013, BMC Public Health, Paul et al. 2016, Nat. Scient. Rep. Tran et 
al. 2016, Plos NTD). 
 
DISSENSUS:  
 
Monitoring weak signals that would indicate an infectious risk is difficult and unreliable, as the emergence 
of an infectious agent is an event of extremely low probability resulting from a combination of 
independent events, which are themselves of low probability. These events may also be subject to high 
spatio-temporal and non-synchronous variability. 
This is nonetheless the objective of international programmes such as PREDICT (Mazet et al. 2015, 
EcoHealth, Joly et al. 2016, Int J Inf Dis). Furthermore, mapping emergence zones remains difficult 
because most of the parameters that are taken into account are associated with hazard rather than 
exposure (see Chavy et al. 2019, PLoS Negl Trop Dis) or vulnerability (Guégan et al. 2020, Env. Res. Let.). 
Thus, so-called emergence risk zones are often spatially over-estimated or poorly identified. These 
observations also apply to the relationship between climate change and infectious diseases, including 
vector-borne diseases.   
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
Modelling efforts are ongoing but lack development to produce usable results in terms of predictive 
power. At the very least, they can guide surveillance strategies and identify priorities requiring further 
attention. 
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
Research on the presence of hosts, human commensal species, and more generally species that are 
closely associated with humans (synanthropic species), as well as the location of areas where there are 
disruptions in the balance of ecosystems (natural, agricultural and urban environments), would make it 
possible to better locate potential infectious risk (Han et al. 2015, PNAS). The historical context of 
  p. 46 
 
epidemics also needs to be taken into account in order to understand how these outbreaks, and their 
warning signals, have been interpreted by different groups (populations, State services, etc.). Local 
populations should also be included in eco-epidemiological participatory research approaches (providing 
information on the local history of epidemics, on changes to the ecosystem, the hydrological system, the 
behaviour of animals, insects, etc.), and should contribute to the establishment of local observatories. 
It is essential to develop, in parallel with biodiversity conservation, surveillance systems that can detect 
weak signals that could signify the start of an epidemic in humans or domestic animals (Holmes et al. 
2018, Nature), as well as generic surveillance systems that can detect other anomalies (clinical, 
epidemiological, etc.). Surveillance must be based on research and methodological developments at the 
interface between health sciences, social sciences and biodiversity sciences. Integrated ("One Health") 
surveillance should be developed at the interface between human and animal populations and the 
environment (Bordier et al. 2018, Prev Vet Med).  
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
Previous research has identified the possibility of emergence of a coronavirus-induced SARS (Cheng et al. 
2007, Clin Microbiol Rev). In a context as that of Covid-19 (i.e. animal markets, hunting of certain species 
and large-scale trade) predictions are not required. Hunting and wildlife trafficking should have provided 
early warning signals.  
To help prevent future epidemics/pandemics such as Covid-19, Daszak et al. (2020, Biosafety and Health) 
have proposed a programme based on the surveillance of wildlife that are likely to be reservoirs for 
zoonotic agents and of human populations at high-risk of contact with wildlife. 
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SHEET 19 
Is it possible to identify sentinel species? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
The identification of sentinel species, which could be used to detect disease emergence risk by providing 
advance warning, may be possible in certain known cases once the dynamics of the pathogen are 
understood. Certain life traits of host species harbouring potential human pathogens may justify 
prioritising the surveillance of these species, in particular species that are increasing in abundance and 
expanding their range by adapting to anthropized landscapes (Johnson et al. 2020, Proc. R. Soc. B.). 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
No notable dissensus to date. 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
It is difficult to generalize this approach, as it will depend on the zoonotic infection in question. It may be 
difficult to detect new pathogens in this way. 
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
This type of approach is conceivable but requires more knowledge of the characteristics of a particular 
species in its ability to warn about potential risks, as well as of the dynamics of different pathogens. 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
The origin and mode of transmission of the pathogen responsible for the Covid-19 crisis are not yet fully 
established, making it difficult to monitor potential future emergences. However, monitoring species that 
are known to harbour viruses of the coronavirus family can help identify potential risks. 
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SHEET 20 
Could the management or eradication of wild species or populations that are likely to 
cause zoonoses be an alternative? How can we avoid the negative reactions in certain 
sections of the population to species seen as potential sources of zoonotic diseases and 
epidemics? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
The first question refers in part to previous sections (SHEET 6 and SHEET 8) on the taxonomic groups 
(excluding invertebrates) that are likely to be sources of zoonotic diseases or act as potential intermediate 
hosts. This question only makes sense from a scientific point of view if we can accurately identify which 
higher taxonomic groups, possibly even species, are most likely to be involved in new outbreaks of 
zoonoses. This is not always possible, although there is consensus as to the potential role of certain higher 
groups (e.g. Rodentia, Chiroptera, primates, Artiodactyla, Carnivora, in descending order of importance) 
for the transmission viruses, and in certain specific cases where the species responsible for the outbreak 
has been clearly identified. However, scientists are not the only ones with a say on this issue, especially 
when the press, the public or political figures start blaming particular taxa, such as bats, which then 
become the object of rejection by affected populations who will demand the removal or elimination of 
these animals. 
 
The pure and simple elimination of a particular taxon, entire populations or sub-populations in a given 
area, beyond the ethical problems it raises, is problematic and raises the question of the impact the loss 
of this population would have on the ecosystem. This solution can only be envisaged in the case of 
invasive species. Nonetheless, drastic reductions in host populations are regularly proposed. Yet, beyond 
the fact that this practice is increasingly seen as unacceptable by society, it may be counterproductive in 
terms of health objectives. In certain specific cases, reducing host population density has significantly 
helped resolve a health crisis: for example, the culling of wild boars has contributed to the management 
of African swine fever outbreaks in Europe. The elimination of individuals can also contribute, alongside 
other methods, to controlling local outbreaks of, for instance, tuberculosis in badgers or brucellosis in 
ibexes. In other cases, the large scale indiscriminate elimination of individuals often has a disruptive effect 
which increases disease risk. This has been shown for instance for rabies and echinococcosis. The relative 
failure of badger culls in England in reducing the prevalence of bovine tuberculosis is very illustrative at 
this level and has just led the British government to abandon this practice, which was not well accepted 
by the public. In Uganda in 2008, a local population of flying foxes (bats) was almost completely 
exterminated, and the caves that sheltered them were sealed off, following cases of haemorrhagic fever 
linked to the Marburg virus. This resulted four years later in a serious epidemic, caused by the Marburg 
virus, associated with the return of a bat population that was much more infected than the one that was 
present in 2007-2008. 
The use of genetic control methods (genome editing, gene drive, CRISPR-Cas-9) in mammalian 
populations to locally eradicate host populations of pathogens will also have to be limited, considering the 
risk of spreading these genetic modifications in the wild or transferring them into other species, and the 
ethical issues raised by these prospects. 
 
When it is possible, the vaccination of humans, domestic or farm animals but also of wild hosts is an 
effective solution (e.g. rabies in Europe and the New World, foot and mouth disease in South Africa, 
Kyasanur forest virus, Nipah virus, etc.). Vaccination is considered an option for Ebola in great apes, 
particularly in "habituated" populations (scientific and tourism activities) and for reducing the 
transmission of bovine tuberculosis (bTB) by badgers in Great Britain. Vaccination of wild boars in Spain 
and brushtail possums in New Zealand is also being considered to control bTB. The best example of 
successful wildlife vaccination remains the eradication of terrestrial rabies in Western Europe through the 
vaccination of foxes. 
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Rather than considering culling wild animals, human populations should keep away from potential hosts 
of zoonotic diseases and ensure the same, as far as possible, for farmed animals and pets. This includes 
hunting, handling and consuming wild species that are potential hosts for pathogens. The knowledge 
acquired on the behaviour of these hosts can be used to limit their access to resources or habitats and 
protect against the risk of contamination (e.g. bats of the genus Pteropus, which are sources of the Nipah 
virus in Asia). Better waste and food resource management can help avoid attracting wildlife close to 
human habitations and thus reduce the risk of transmission. Education, especially of children, can help 
reduce the risk of direct interaction with wildlife by teaching them to not handle these animals. 
 
In order to avoid negative reactions in certain populations to species perceived as potentially dangerous 
(or conversely species seen as totemic, sacred, untouchable), investment in raising awareness and 
education is essential. This investment has to be adapted to the cultural particularities of different human 
societies. In particular, it should be stressed that although an animal can, under particular circumstances, 
spread a pathogenic agent, this does not alter its role in the functioning of an ecosystem and thus in the 
maintenance of the major life cycles that are indispensable to humans. Scientists have a role to play here 
to avoid contributing to the stigmatization of certain taxonomic groups. 
 
Bibliography: Kikuti et al, 2011, Zoon. Pub. Health, Harrison et al, 2011, Biol. Conserv., Amman et al. 2014, 
Em. Infec. Dis., Thanapongtharm et al. 2015, BMC Vet. Res., Ajesh et al. 2016, Zoon. Pub. Health, 
Leendertz et al, 2017, Mam. Rev., De Vos et al. 2016, Ecol. and Soc., Velasco-Villa et al. 2017, Antiviral 
Res., Sutherland et al, 2018, TREE, Carter et al, 2018, Plos One, Singh et al, 2019, Vet. Quarter., Parsons et 
al, 2019, Microb. Biotech., Ham et al, 2019, J. Appl. Ecol., ANSES, 2019, Prentice et al, 2019, 
J.R.S.Interface, Miguel et al, 2020, Nature Comm Biology). 
 
DISSENSUS: 
 
No dissensus apart from the fact that it is difficult to attempt to specifically regulate species or 
populations without (i) being certain that they are involved in a zoonosis and (ii) without placing this 
strategy within a wider approach that considers the functioning of biological communities and the 
interactions that take place within them. 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
It is difficult to have a clear idea of the consequences of management/regulation strategies, given the 
complexity of ecosystem interaction networks. There are a few studies on the eco-epidemiological 
consequences of management/regulation strategies (although this topic could be better documented); 
there is, in particular, a significant lack of studies on the evolutionary consequences (e.g. evolution of 
virulence; impact on genetic and immunogenetic diversity, impact on the immune response...) of these 
strategies. (Sarrazin & Lecomte 2016, Science, Jorgensen et al. 2019, Annu. Rev. Ecol. Evol. Syst). 
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
There is a need to develop studies on the evolutionary consequences of wildlife management strategies. 
Investment in the dissemination of scientific knowledge is also needed so that human practices can evolve 
to take into account the ecology of animals that are likely to spread pathogens.  
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
Reduce illegal wildlife trade, end bushmeat consumption including the consumption of species that are 
potentially involved in zoonoses, implement reasoned and science-based population management of 
these species. 
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SHEET 21 
Can the development of protected areas help reduce the risk of zoonotic diseases? What 
are the processes involved and what would be the required level of protection? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
If we consider that there is a link between biodiversity degradation and the occurrence of zoonoses (see 
fact sheets 9-12), and that it can be explained, to a large extent, by increased contact between humans 
and wildlife, either from increased human presence in natural habitats or the destruction of these 
habitats through land use changes (e.g. deforestation), then the option of reducing these contacts by 
establishing protected areas, where both land use and human incursions into natural habitats, and 
associated activities including wildlife harvesting, are strictly limited, makes sense. 
 
In addition, from an ecological point of view, and even if there is some disagreement within the scientific 
community, the hypothesis that maintaining biological communities with high species-level diversity 
within protected areas would prevent the emergence of major disease-causing pathogens reinforces the 
importance of having protected areas (SHEET 22). 
 
Such as policy promoting the development of protected areas can be achieved by creating new areas, 
expanding existing areas and, above all, increasing their protection level (i.e. by further reducing human 
activity), even though the current trend worldwide is to reduce actual protection levels.  
 
Still, we face multiple and complex challenges. Protecting biodiversity implies that we are effectively also 
protecting potential sources of zoonoses. It also means managing the interface between protected areas 
and peripheral areas of human activity, where contacts occur, in particular between domestic animals and 
wildlife, and paying particular attention to urban expansion near protected areas. At this level, a fractal 
dimension of boundaries should be minimized. 
 
Protecting biodiversity also means limiting resource extraction and exploitation, while taking into account 
and managing the need of certain populations for bushmeat. It also means better regulation of tourism 
and recreational activities that are a source of contact between humans and wildlife, and of reciprocal 
pathogen transmission, even though these activities provide an income for local populations and 
contribute to different aspects of human well-being. 
 
We are therefore faced with issues of social acceptability, political and economic constraints and the need 
to educate the public given the growing concerns surrounding the risk of zoonoses and epidemics; there 
may be concerns over the establishment of new protected areas and the future of existing ones may be 
called into question. Clearly, this type of strategy, beyond the conceptual evidence in support of it, must 
be implemented at the appropriate territorial scale. This means encouraging dialogue with local 
populations, who may play a role in protection and access regulation (sacred or community forests), all 
the while acknowledging the dual imperative of protecting biodiversity and limiting the transmission of 
pathogens to humans, farm animals or wildlife. 
 
Bibliography: Aubertin 2015, Forests, Trees and Livlihoods, Bauch et al. 2015, PNAS, Cohen et al. 2016, 
PNAS, De Vos et al. 2016, Ecol. 2016, Ecol. & Soc. 2017, Terraube et al. 2017, Cur. Envir. op. Sust. Sust., 
Kilpatrick et al. 2017, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, Adams et al. 2019, Nature Sust. Geldmann et al. 2019, PNAS, 
Golden Kroner et al. 2019, Science, Naidoo et al. 2019, Sci. Adv. Veldhuis et al. 2019, Science, Yergeau, 
2019, World Dev. Halsey 2019, Nature Evol. & Ecol. Ecol. 2020, Tran et al. 2020, Biol. Cons. Leberger et al. 
2020, Biol. Cons. 2020, Biol. Cons. Mammids, 2020, Biol. Cons. Selwood and Zimmer 2020, Biol. Cons. 
Corlett et al. 2020, Biol. Cons. Rohr et al. 2020, Nature Ecol. & Evol. Mokany et al. 2020, PNAS. 
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DISSENSUS: 
 
There is a recurring debate within the scientific community as to whether the development of protected 
areas should be prioritised over other approaches of biodiversity conservation that may also lead to an 
improved management of the relationship between humans and wildlife. These dissenting views are 
related in part to the ongoing debate between land sharing (Leblan 2017, EHESS Coll. "In Time & Place") 
and land sparing (Oates 1999, Univ Cali Press) and do not directly address the issue of zoonoses. As 
indicated above, the hypothesis that maintaining biological communities with high species diversity would 
prevent the emergence of major disease-causing pathogens remains controversial (see the dilution effect 
hypothesis - i.e.the negative correlation between host richness and host infection levels, see fact sheet 
22- versus the amplification hypothesis). These two hypotheses are certainly not mutually exclusive and 
may depend on the spatial scale of analysis. Overall, it is likely that the relationship between biodiversity 
and disease risk is not linear. 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
Current knowledge of the mechanisms underlying the emergence patterns of zoonotic diseases is still too 
patchy to accurately estimate the benefits that can be derived from different strategies of large-scale 
biodiversity conservation. 
 
NEED FOR RESEARCH: 
 
Research is needed at different levels, from understanding the mechanisms linking biodiversity, pathogen 
diversity, the prevalence of pathogens in their respective hosts and zoonosis risk, to a better assessment 
of the health benefits that can be expected from having protected areas (and the impact of different 
protection levels, up to the highest), without neglecting the cost-benefit aspect of these measures 
compared to other modes of public health interventions. The EcoHealth paradigm could be associated 
with the concept of resilience and landscape-level epidemiological data. A major investment in research is 
needed, both nationally and internationally. 
 
SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
There is no specificity associated with the Covid-19 phenomenon at this level. Choosing a strategy with 
the dual objective of preserving biodiversity and reducing the risk of zoonoses, and informed by scientific 
evidence and work that is needed to fill the gaps in our knowledge, should make it possible to partly 
reduce the risk of new occurrence of such pandemics. 
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SHEET 22 
Does maintaining high species/genetic biodiversity prevent or limit the emergence of 
zoonotic diseases? How generalizable is the dilution effect? 
 
CONSENSUS: 
 
Following on from previous work, Schmidt and Ostfield (2001, Ecology) put forward the hypothesis of a 
“dilution effect“. According to Morand and Lajaunie (2018, Iste Editions), this hypothesis "suggests that 
host species richness and diversity play a protective role in the spread of pathogens”. The dilution effect 
depends on the state of the ecosystem. It is assumed that ecosystems under low anthropogenic stress, 
whose functioning and dynamics are closer to a natural state, should have higher levels of biodiversity. 
These ‘undisturbed’ ecosystems harbour species that vary in their ability (competence) to transmit 
pathogens: some species would have a high parasitic/bacterial/viral load, and others would be unable to 
transmit pathogens. Thus, in a species-rich ecosystem, the latter species, unable to transmit a pathogen, 
would dilute its transmission. If there really is a dilution effect, this would be beneficial to both humans 
and ecosystems. High biodiversity within communities can also imply greater diversity within different 
trophic levels, in particular with the presence of predators that control the density of reservoir species,  as 
seen with foxes, rodents and Lyme’s disease (Hofmeester et al. 2017, Proc Roy Soc B). Conversely, the 
introduction of alien species can affect (positively or negatively) reservoir populations (Morand and 
Lajaunie 2018, Iste Editions).  
 
In parallel, populations with low genetic diversity appear to be more susceptible to the emergence of 
zoonoses. This is the case, for example, for recently established genetically depleted populations of the 
gastropod Biomphalaria and the zoonotic agent responsible for bilharziosis (Campbell et al. 2010). 
Theoretical and experimental models support the link between low genetic diversity (for genes associated 
with pathogen resistance) and emergence risk (Chabas et al. 2018, Plos Biol). 
Once the species barrier has been crossed (spillover), it is generally well-accepted (based on theoretical, 
empirical and experimental studies) that populations with high genetic diversity have greater resistance 
to infectious agents and are better able to adapt to new pathogens (see King and Lively 2012, Heredity). 
The relationship between genetic diversity and susceptibility to infection does not appear to be related to 
inbreeding depression (Spielman et al. 2004, PNAS, Ebert et al. 2007, J Roy Soc Interface), but to the 
diversity of the genes involved in immunity or the presence of particular alleles/genotypes associated 
with pathogen resistance. The numerous immunogenetic studies conducted on MHC (major 
histocompatibility complex) genes in natural populations have also highlighted the link between the 
presence/absence of alleles and infection risk, but only very rarely between the latter and heterozygosity 
(Sarri et al. 2016, Plos One). Although there are some counter-examples (Springbett et al. 2003, Genetics, 
Yates et al. 2006, Proc Biol Sci, Nath et al. 2008, J Anim Sci), a recent meta-analysis (Ekroth et al. 2019, 
Proc Roy Soc B) has shown that low genetic diversity in populations is correlated with increased parasite 
success (infection prevalence and load), although only for microparasites, not for macroparasites. 
Finally, many empirical studies have shown that new pathogens displayed reduced adaptive capacity and 
evolved less virulence when they were introduced into genetically diverse host populations (see 
references in Signe White et al. 2020, Biol. Let.). Indeed, high genetic diversity in the host population 
leads to an evolutionary trade-off (antagonistic pleiotropy) in the infectious agent, whereas low genetic 
diversity reduces this trade-off and favours the specialization and expansion of virulent pathogens. 
These studies are important because they show that populations/species with low genetic diversity are 
more susceptible to infections, and that their infectious agents are more likely to evolve into highly 
virulent forms (e.g. the microbiota of the last hunter-gatherers was richer and more diverse than that of 
present-day urban westerners). These findings may guide reintroduction/rewilding strategies, by paying 
particular attention to potential infectious risks and by advocating the translocation of organisms within 
their native range over assisted colonisation (IUCN 2013). 
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DISSENSUS: 
 
Recent meta-analyses seem to corroborate the dilution effect hypothesis (Civitello et al. 2015, PNAS, 
Johnson et al. 2015, Ecol Lett, Johnson et al. 2015, Ecol Lett), unlike the results from Salkeld et al. in 2013 
(Ecol Lett). In addition, this effect has been observed for several vector-borne diseases (Morand and 
Lajaunie 2018, Iste Editions, Ezenwa 2006, Proc Biol Sci). More work is needed to understand the 
mechanisms at play, since the way this effect has been formulated has itself been highly criticized, and 
this has led to different interpretations of sometimes contradictory data (Randolph and Dobson 2012, 
Parasitology, Hosseini et al. 2017, Phil Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci). Nevertheless, some general principles 
seem to have emerged. The dilution effect only works if the least competent species, also assumed to be 
the least abundant, are the first to disappear when biodiversity decreases, and if their importance is 
measured in terms of frequency rather than prevalence/abundance. The dilution effect also seems robust 
for biodiversity gradients when there is an erosion of biodiversity (Halliday et al. 2020, BioRxiv). Besides, 
some experts emphasize that high levels of biodiversity will protect against an epidemic/pandemic but 
much less against an emergence; high biodiversity levels increase microbiological hazard but not 
necessarily infectious risk ("hazard vs risk").  
As to the role of genetic diversity in preventing outbreaks, there may be cases where high host genetic 
diversity may increase the likelihood that an infectious agent with low diversity meets a susceptible host 
(Boomsma and Ratnieks 1996, Phil Trans Roy Soc B, Van Baalen and Beekman 2006, Am Nat). 
 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR ANALYTICAL BIAS: 
 
Although the dilution effect seems fairly generalizable, the conditions required for this effect remain to be 
determined. Much basic data on infectious systems are still lacking today (e.g. host competence, trophic 
preference of vectors, link between reservoir and vector abundance). 
Many studies have been carried out on the link between genetic diversity and disease emergence in 
invertebrates, but there is a lack of empirical data on vertebrate/pathogen systems. The existence of an 
acquired immune system could influence the results previously obtained in invertebrates. 
In addition, the genetic diversity of vertebrate animal populations has mainly been inferred from MHC 
genes. MHC variation does seem to reflect the potential for population viability and pathogen resistance 
(Radwan et al. 2010, Biol Cons, Sommer 2005, Front Zool). However, genome-wide studies or the study of 
other immunity genes are needed to confirm this trend. 
 
RESEARCH NEEDS: 
 
Given the issues that have fuelled the debate on the dilution effect (formulation, confounding factors), it 
would be necessary to theoretically identify the conditions required for seeing a dilution effect and the 
circumstances under which these conditions are met (and identify gaps in our knowledge), for example by 
combining and analysing data from published case studies. 
Concerning the importance of population genetic diversity in preventing zoonotic disease emergence risk, 
we need to better understand the relative influence of genetic diversity versus population density, as 
these characteristics may be strongly correlated. 
It would be particularly interesting to analyse whether there is a minimum threshold of genetic diversity 
that guarantees resistance to the introduction of infectious agents, and to define how these thresholds of 
genetic diversity vary according to reservoir traits, geographical area, etc. (Lively et al. 2014, Am Nat). 
Another element of intraspecific biodiversity that should be taken into account when studying the 
relationship between biodiversity and pathogen emergence is the microbiota. Numerous empirical and 
experimental studies have shown that it influences the susceptibility of hosts to infectious agents (Knutie 
et al. 2017, Nature Com, Koch and Schmid-Hempel 2012, Ecol Lett). However, the relative influence of the 
genetic characteristics of the host (immunogenetics, diversity), of its microbiota (composition, diversity) 
and of their interaction on the link between biodiversity and zoonosis emergence is not yet known 
(Trevelline et al. 2020, Mol Ecol). 
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SPECIAL CASE OF COVID-19: 
 
In the case of the Covid-19 crisis, there is insufficient knowledge on the ecology of the animal 
communities that are presumed to harbour the coronavirus reservoir animals (fruit bats and pangolins) to 
formulate working hypotheses.  
